Audit committees (ACs) play a vital role in the capital markets’ investor protection framework through their oversight of audit engagement and financial reporting process based on the regulation of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). According to SOX requirements, ACs are primarily responsible for independent supervision of outside financial reporting, internal controls to address key risks and auditor activity, including appointing external auditors and settling audit fees (SOX Section 301). Previous studies have indicated that independent ACs are more likely to demand auditors with stronger reputations (Chen and Zhou, 2007; Goodwin-Stewart and Kent, 2006; Lennox and Park, 2007). However, prior literature notes that economic incentives are determinants of AC independence (Barrier, 2002; Bédard et al., 2004; Carcello and Neal, 2003) and weaken the AC’s objectivity and oversight quality (Archambeault et al., 2008; Magilke et al., 2009)[1]. Bierstaker et al. (2012) provide experimental evidence concerning the effects of stock options on AC monitoring performance, finding that perceived fairness is affected when AC compensation includes long-term stock options. Keune and Johnstone (2015) illustrate the agency conflicts that can arise when compensating ACs with stock options. The issue of the consequences of AC incentive compensation is increasingly important. Since the Enron scandal and SOX, the audit market in US companies has undergone substantial changes (Ahmed, 2010; Ettredge et al., 2007; Glass, Lewis & Co., 2005; Grothe and Weirich, 2007; Landsman et al., 2009; Taub, 2004). One notable change is a growing trend in the number of companies realigning to non-Big 4 auditing firms. Carver et al. (2011) indicate that companies switching from Big 4 to non-Big 4 auditors experience a significant increase in discretionary accruals following these auditor switches[2]. However, Carver et al. (2011) ignore the role of ACs in the process of auditor switches. Prior research illustrates that the incentive-based compensation provided to AC members is associated with AC quality (Archambeault et al., 2008; Bierstaker et al., 2012; Campbell et al., 2015; Keune and Johnstone 2015; Persellin 2013). This study extends these studies and addresses the following questions: Q1. Given that a company has dismissed its auditors, how do AC members’ economic incentives affect their oversight of the new auditor? Q2. Does this relationship vary depending on the type of new auditor?