In recent years, there has been considerable evolution in corporate social responsibility (CSR), specifically in the way that companies have begun approaching CSR as a new strategy for improving their image and gaining competitive advantage; this may increase firm value as highlighted by Robinson et al. (2011).1 The literature on CSR has shifted from focusing on the relationship between CSR and firm performance (e.g., Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Margolis et al., 2007), to several other relevant topics in corporate finance, such as the impact of CSR on the cost of capital (El Ghoul et al., 2011), debt maturity (Benlemlih, 2017), the capital structure (Girerd-Potin et al., 2011), and information asymmetry (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Our paper is related but different from this existent literature. Indeed, most of prior studies focus on the value creation associated with high CSR involvement (e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, 2003). Yet, it is relevant to investigate to what extent CSR affects the distribution of this wealth. More precisely, our study focuses on the impact of CSR on dividend policy: one of the major financial decisions for most firms. Dividends are considered the most commonly used payout device in the corporate world. Since the dividend irrelevance theory posited by Miller and Modigliani (1961),2 extensive theoretical and empirical work has suggested different explanations of the dividend policy puzzle, namely, agency theory (e.g., Kalay, 1980), the “bird-in-the-hand” theory (e.g., Gordon, 1963; Lintner, 1962), signaling theory (e.g., Ross, 1977), and life-cycle theory (e.g., Fama and French, 2001). Despite substantial research, the dividend puzzle is far from being solved, even in the US context (Shao et al., 2010). Motivated by the importance of dividend policy in corporate finance, as well as the growing interest in CSR, this paper aims to define how dividend policy is influenced by firms’ CSR level. There are potentially two important theoretical arguments that could explain why CSR activities may have an effect on firm dividend policy. On the one hand, the first argument is based on the free cash flow argument of Jensen (1986). Jensen argues that managers with large free cash flow have incentives to overinvest beyond an optimal level. High dividend payout policy reduces the resources under managers’ control and constrains them from diverting free cash flow. From a CSR perspective, it is argued that managers derive private benefits from being identified as socially responsible (Brown et al., 2006). These private benefits associated with high CSR identification are likely to encourage overinvestment in social and environmental activities. This argument is particularly true when firms have access to high cash in place (Barnea and Rubin, 2010). If dividend policy serves as a disciplinary mechanism that avoids social overinvestment and prevents managers from wasting cash through high social expenditures, thus, we expect a positive relationship between CSR and dividend payout. On the other hand, the second argument is based on the signaling theory of dividends (e.g. Bhattacharya, 1979).