مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی – الزویر ۲۰۱۸

مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی – الزویر ۲۰۱۸

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله تأثیر انگیزه مسابقات بر روی ارائه مجدد امور مالی: شواهد از چین
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله The Effect of Tournament Incentives on Financial Restatements: Evidence From China
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۸
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۱۸ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research Article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۰٫۸۲۶ در سال ۲۰۱۷
شاخص H_index ۴۵ در سال ۲۰۱۹
شاخص SJR ۰٫۴۹۸ در سال ۲۰۱۷
شناسه ISSN ۰۰۲۰-۷۰۶۳
شاخص Quartile (چارک) Q2 در سال ۲۰۱۷
رشته های مرتبط مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط مدیریت مالی، مدیریت کسب و کار، مدیریت اجرایی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله  مجله بین المللی حسابداری – International Journal of Accounting
دانشگاه  Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics – China
کلمات کلیدی انگیزه مسابقات، اصلاحیه های مالی، مدیر عامل شرکت، شرکت های دولتی (SOEs)، حاکمیت شرکتی
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Tournament incentives، Financial restatements، CEO turnover، State-owned enterprises (SOEs)، Corporate governance
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intacc.2018.05.002
کد محصول  E10771
وضعیت ترجمه مقاله  ترجمه آماده این مقاله موجود نمیباشد. میتوانید از طریق دکمه پایین سفارش دهید.
دانلود رایگان مقاله دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی
سفارش ترجمه این مقاله سفارش ترجمه این مقاله

 

فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Abstract

۱- Introduction

۲- Institutional environment and executive compensation in China

۳- Literature review and hypothesis development

۴- Research design

۵- Empirical analysis

۶- Robustness tests

۷- Concluding

References

بخشی از متن مقاله:

Abstract

In this study, we examine the association between tournament incentives and financial restatements in China. Prior research documents that tournament incentives have a positive impact on firm performance. However, an alternative view suggests that tournament incentives can also have detrimental effects on firm performance. Using a sample of Chinese listed companies for the years 2008–۲۰۱۵, we find that tournament incentives, in the form of large pay disparities, reduce the occurrence of both core and non-core financial restatements. This negative association is more pronounced for SOEs as compared to non-SOEs. We further document that the negative association between tournament incentives and financial restatements is related to CEO turnover, and is stronger if the successor CEO is recruited from within the organization. This research contributes to a better understanding of tournament incentives, as a corporate governance mechanism, in constraining the occurrence of financial restatements in a unique institutional setting where state ownership is pronounced.

Introduction

This paper examines the impact of tournament incentives on the occurrence of financial restatements in China. The separation of ownership and control gives rise to information asymmetries that managers may use to exploit outside individual shareholders (Berle & Means, 1991; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To minimize such sub-optimal managerial actions, researchers have identified a number of pure market forces, such as product market competition (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958), the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965), and labor market pressure (Fama, 1980). However, despite these market controls, there remains residual demand for additional governance measures, such as well-designed managerial compensation schemes: an explicit form of compensation. A substantial body of academic research has investigated the association between this form of compensation and firm performance in various countries (Aggarwal & Samwick, 2006; Baker, Jensen, & Murphy, 1988; Cheng & Firth, 2006; Conyon & He, 2011; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Kaplan, 1994; Kato & Long, 2006; Mengistae & Colin Xu, 2004; Tang & Sun, 2014; Xin & Tan, 2009). However, an implicit compensation scheme in the form of rank-order tournaments also exists (Lazear & Rosen, 1981; Lin & Lu, 2009). Tournament theory views executives as competitors contesting for promotion, and the large pay gap between the CEO and other executives becomes the prize for the tournament (Bognanno, 2001; Eriksson, 1999; Kale, Reis, & Venkateswaran, 2009; Lazear & Rosen, 1981). A large pay disparity motivates non-CEO senior executives to work hard and to invest in firm-specific human capital and, thus, helps build a motivated pool of internal candidates for the CEO position. Such a pool of internal candidates increases the bargaining power of the board, thus fostering positive CEO actions. Therefore, this perspective predicts a positive association between pay disparity and firm performance (Kale etal., 2009), and a negative association between pay disparity and the cost of capital (Chen, Huang, & Wei, 2013).

ثبت دیدگاه