This Special Issue owes its origin to a Special Session on Game Theory and Fisheries Economics at the 18th Biennial Conference of the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade (IIFET) held in Aberdeen, Scotland, in July 2016. The Special Session was mounted in recognition of the growing importance of the theory of strategic interaction, game theory, to fisheries economics. So successful was the Special Session that it was felt that further steps should be promptly taken. The Special Issue of this journal is the result. Several papers presented at the Special Session were, as hoped, revised and submitted for publication in this Special Issue. It was decided, however, that submissions should not be restricted to those participating in the IIFET Conference Special Session. All IIFET members, with an interest in game theory, were invited to make submissions. A game theoretic situation, let us be reminded, is deemed to arise when the actions of one “individual” have a perceptible impact upon one or more “individuals”, leading to a strategic interaction between or among the “individuals”. The relevance of the theory of such strategic interaction, game theory, to the economics of fisheries management has evolved gradually over time.

۱٫۱٫ Evolution of the application of game theory to fisheries economics: the role of international fisheries

While increasing recognition is now being given today to the importance of game theory in fisheries economics, such was not always the case. The origin of modern fisheries economics is commonly traced back to the publication of H. Scott Gordon’s seminal article, “The Economic Theory of a Common Property Resource: The Fishery” (Gordon, 1954). The year 2019 will mark the 65th anniversary of that article. Up until the 25th anniversary of the Gordon article, game theory played little or no role in fisheries economics. The year 2019 will also happen to mark the 40th anniversary of the first article on a fisheries economics topic explicitly employing game theory (Munro, 1979).