مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد خنثی شدن درآمد عمدی با توجه به توانایی مدیریتی – Sage 2017

Prior research provides substantial evidence that high-ability managers generate more accurate future earnings forecasts and more effectively implement their chosen strategies than lower ability managers (Baik, Farber, & Lee, 2011; Bertrand & Schoar, 2003; Demerjian, Lev, & McVay, 2012; Holcomb, Holmes, & Connelly, 2009). These skills are the building blocks that underpin the superior earnings quality reported by high-ability managers (Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, & Lee, 2005; Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, & McVay, 2013). Yet, these same skills can also facilitate earnings management, including earnings smoothing. Earnings smoothing requires managers to accurately forecast future earnings, and then increase or decrease current income to both reduce earnings volatility and generate future reporting slack (DeFond & Park, 1997). Thus, we investigate if high-ability managers are more likely than other managers to intentionally smooth earnings.1 We also explore the future performance consequences and incentives associated with high-ability managers’ intentional smoothing. Ex ante, the relation between managerial ability and intentional smoothing is unclear. We expect that high-ability managers will have a better understanding of the trend line around which to smooth because they are able to generate better earnings forecasts (Baik et al., 2011; Beidleman, 1973; DeFond & Park, 1997; Moses, 1987). As a result, they are likely more capable of reporting smooth earnings than low-ability managers. We also expect that high-ability managers are better able to identify adjustments that smooth earnings at a lower cost than other managers, thereby maximizing the net benefits of intentionally smoothed earnings.2 Although we expect that high-ability managers have the ability to smooth earnings more effectively than other managers, this innate ability does not mean that they will necessarily choose to intentionally smooth. First, it is possible that high-ability managers more effectively manage their companies, obviating the need for discretionary smoothing. Second, even with the need to intentionally smooth, higher ability managers may opt not to do so. For example, if high-ability managers have valuable reputations, which garner them greater lifelong compensation (e.g., Demerjian et al., 2012; Fee & Hadlock, 2003), and intentional smoothing could harm their reputations, then they may avoid intentional smoothing.