مقاله انگلیسی رایگان در مورد انحراف مدیریتی، رقابت بازار محصول و عملکرد شرکت – الزویر ۲۰۱۸

elsevier

 

مشخصات مقاله
ترجمه عنوان مقاله انحراف مدیریتی، رقابت بازار محصول و عملکرد شرکت
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله Managerial diversion, product market competition, and firm performance
انتشار مقاله سال ۲۰۱۸
تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی ۲۵ صفحه
هزینه دانلود مقاله انگلیسی رایگان میباشد.
پایگاه داده نشریه الزویر
نوع نگارش مقاله
مقاله پژوهشی (Research article)
مقاله بیس این مقاله بیس میباشد
نمایه (index) scopus – master journals – JCR
نوع مقاله ISI
فرمت مقاله انگلیسی  PDF
ایمپکت فاکتور(IF)
۱٫۸۰۰ در سال ۲۰۱۷
شاخص H_index ۵۶ در سال ۲۰۱۸
شاخص SJR ۱٫۰۷۷ در سال ۲۰۱۸
رشته های مرتبط مدیریت
گرایش های مرتبط مدیریت عملکرد، بازاریابی، مدیریت اجرایی
نوع ارائه مقاله
ژورنال
مجله / کنفرانس بررسی اقتصاد چین – China Economic Review
دانشگاه Business School – Sun Yat-sen University – PR China
کلمات کلیدی پاداش مدیر اجرایی، انحراف مدیریتی، رفتار بازار محصول، شرکت های دولتی، چين
کلمات کلیدی انگلیسی Executive compensation, Managerial diversion, Product market behavior, State-owned enterprises, China
شناسه دیجیتال – doi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2018.04.009
کد محصول E10010
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فهرست مطالب مقاله:
Highlights
Abstract
Keywords
JEL classification
۱ Introduction
۲ Managerial diversion and product market competition
۳ Hypotheses development
۴ Data, variables, and model
۵ Empirical analysis
۶ Robustness check
۷ Conclusions
Funding
Appendix A. Derivations for the Duopoly Cournot Model
Appendix B. Derivations for the n-firm Cournot competition model with m firms faced with the managerial diversion problem
Appendix C. Derivations for the incomplete information under Cournot Competition
Appendix D. Derivations for the Bertrand Competition model
Appendix E. Definition of Variables
References

بخشی از متن مقاله:
ABSTRACT

We derive the conditions under which a manager will divert and how managerial diversion affects product market performance and firm profits. Our model predicts that managerial diversion is more likely to occur and leads to more aggressive product market behavior in a firm with weak incentives and corporate governance. In these firms, the relation between managerial diversion and firm profits is inverse U-shaped. Chinese state-owned manufacturing firms are used to test our theoretical model, and we find supportive evidence.

Introduction

When ownership and management are separated, the incomplete nature of contracting and monitoring inevitably creates room for managerial opportunism, allowing managers to pursue their private benefits at shareholders’ expense. Prior literature has examined various mechanisms through which managers may divert value from shareholders, including self-dealing, insider trading, embezzlement, perquisites, etc. (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey). For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that, when contracts are incomplete and managers possess more expertise than shareholders, residual rights of control are typically held by the managers, giving them enormous latitude for self-interested behavior. Hand and Rogow (1982) suggest that the imperfection of capital markets make insiders more likely to divert the firm’s financial and managerial resources from productive uses and paralyze decision-making. Extending the current literature, this paper studies when managers engage in diversion and its impact on product market performance and firm profits, using a two-stage dynamic game model. While conventional wisdom suggests that managerial diversion is a rent-seeking behavior that should be disapproved and regulated (Bebchuk & Jolls, 1999; Grossman & Hart, 1980; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Meulbroek, 1992; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002), the existing literature in economics and finance has not yet reached consensus. Easterbrook and Fischel (1991), for example, suggest that managerial diversion is just another form of managerial compensation and, therefore, has no impact on shareholder value. Fama (1980) argues that managerial diversion can be a superior way to incentivize shareholder value creation, provided that its costs are lower than other forms of incentive compensation. He (2006) shows that managerial diversion may occur in equilibrium, and that such diversion may not hurt shareholders if it can incentivize the manager to exert more effort. He and Ho. (2011) argue that when monitoring is inefficient and expensive, the opportunity costs of monitoring are too high. Consequently, it is in the shareholders’ best interest to omit monitoring and allow managers to divert firm resources. Congruously, Bruno and Claessens (2010) show that “over-monitoring” or a straight-jacket of many corporate governance rules can generate costs, harm managerial initiative, and lead to relatively lower returns and valuations. Empirically, Roulstone (2003) finds that firms with more stringent rules on insider trading around quarterly earnings announcements tend to provide their executives with higher total and incentive pay, arguably to compensate managers for potential losses due to such restrictions. Using hand-collected data on perks in Chinese-listed companies, Zhang, Song, and Ding (2015) find strong empirical evidence that perks can motivate managers to work hard and, thus, add to firms’ value (incentive view), which is more likely to occur in firms with moderate ownership concentration. Emphasizing the potential role of diversion as a form of compensation, this strand of literature argues that restrictions on managerial diversion are totally unnecessary.

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