Research on the corporate political strategies (CPS) of foreigninvested firms (FIEs) has experienced rapid growth in recent years (Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Iankova & Katz, 2003; Luo, 2001; Mondejar & Zhao, 2013). As a key component of firms’ nonmarket strategy, CPS helps a firm build better connections with the government and other political institutions, gain access to markets and resources, and cope with environmental pressure and instability (Ahlstrom, Young, Nair, & Law, 2003; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). While the strategic effects and outcomes of CPS have been widely acknowledged and investigated (Boddewyn, 2016), our knowledge on the antecedents and processes of FIEs’ political strategies in emerging markets is still very limited. Therefore it is imperative to achieve a better understanding of why and how FIEs vary in their CPS choices in emerging economies.

The extant literature on factors driving FIEs’ CPS have been largely developed from traditional strategy and management perspectives, which tend to treat firms as unitary, rational, and self-interested actors (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). However, systematic reviews and meta-analyses show that‘‘antecedent variables drawn from traditional theories explaining why firms engage in CPS have limited explanatory ability’’ (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011, p. 238). Particularly missing is the examination of how institutional factors affect firms’ strategic political activities (Lux et al., 2011; Mondejar & Zhao, 2013). While the distinct and complex institutional environment of FIEs can be particularly crucial in shaping their CPS (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, & Eden, 2006), it has received little attention in extant studies (Blumentritt & Nigh, 2002). This neglect can be partly attributed to the overall underdeveloped institutional perspective on organizational strategies in the international business literature (Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). Moreover, because dominant theories of CPS have been developed in the context of advanced Western democracies (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004), the CPS of FIEs in emerging economies have received insufficient theoretical explanation (Deng & Kennedy, 2010; Mondejar & Zhao, 2013). Given the institutional differences between emerging and advanced economies (Anderson & Sutherland, 2015; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005), it is intriguing to investigate the institutional forces that drive FIEs’ CPS in emerging economies.

In addition, much of the research on international business has focused on FIE-host government negotiations at the time of initial entry into a country, while little research has been directed toward the postentry political strategies of FIEs (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Rodriguez et al., 2006). The few studies examining this issuelargely focus on one or two firm-based political tactics, which underrepresents the variety of political tactics in emerging economies (Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002). Moreover, little attention has been paid to the collective form of CPS that firms can utilize to engage the government and shape the external environment (with the exceptions of Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2008; Jacomet, 2005). Even fewer studies have examined firmbased and collective CPS side by side (Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2004; Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005). Consequently, there is an incomplete picture of FIEs’ CPS and also a lack of deep understanding of the relationship between firm-based and collective CPS (Jacomet, 2005).