Surveys usually draw a line between legal under-reporting of tax obligations, known as tax avoidance, and illegal undervaluation, or tax evasion. In the field of economics, however, it is impossible to distinguish between the two (Lipatov, 2005). In this situation, it makes sense to split these understatements into simple and sophisticated, rather than into evasion and avoidance. Simple tax evasion means not using either specialized accounting or financial specialists. Fiscal responsibility of substatements that require special knowledge will be called sophisticated tax evasion [sophisticated tax evasion: Lipatov (2005)]. It is noteworthy that there is no measurement of any type of tax evasion available. Schneider (2006), for example, used informal sector as a proxy to tax evasion. Sophisticated evasion prevents such attempts, because arrangements that are more complex are being considered. Therefore, we observed large cases of inspection and audit in proportion of tax revenue from taxpayers in total tax revenue. In the US, as noted by Slemrod (2004), the latter US fell from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1951 to less than 1.5 percent of GDP in recent years. Indirect evidence for the maintenance of sophisticated evasion is provided by the fact that the largest taxpayers in the US have paid less tax in the last three years, even when they increased yields, as shown by Browning (2004). To solve this problem, many countries have made tax reforms and introduced revenue mobilization (Bekoe et al., 2015). However, academic papers in this area are scarce. Tax evasion with specialists has increased in all sectors, because they need to submit their reports to audits by tax authorities regularly (every three years in most countries). Thus, they used an specialist to guarantee a tax evasion successful (Lipatov 2005). This does not mean that taxpayers are fully protected against the actions of the tax authorities, as has been highlighted by several scandals over the years. Dibra (2016) has prepared a wide collection of material on such scandals, which include the cases of Enron and Parmalat: probably the most famous cases. In addition, conventional tax havens represent sophisticated evasion. Johnston (2003) and Blackburn et al. (2010) showed that sophisticated tax evasion causes corruption and presents problems for economic development. Recently, the use of sophisticated tax evasion has gone beyond corporate boundaries to include individuals with high net worth and high taxable income. These individuals use sophisticated evasion that is difficult to detect because it requires consideration of many legal entities, some of which either may be in another tax jurisdiction (another city, state, or country) or have been settled at the time of the audit (Klepper et al., 1991; Erard, 1993). The economic literature to date contains several contributions to analyze tax evasion and specialists. Reinganum and Wilde (1993) showed the potential of specialists to reduce cost statements. Using a game theory approach, they conclude that tax audit reports prepared by specialists are more effective than other tax audits. In the most recent research, Crocker and Slemrold (2005) suggested that effects of repressive policies depend on whether the agent is penalized. Lipatov (2005) analyzed the problem of tax evasion and shows that tax authorities must conduct more intense auditing of those taxpayers who do not coordinate their evasion decisions jointly. In Brazil, Arbex and Mattos (2012) studied an ideal tax audit policy in an economy where consumers are encouraged to require tax reports of Brazilian companies through. The results of their study showed that these discounts are positive and more effective than is the probability of audit by the State. Del Vecchio Junior (2012) showed that game theory is an important addition to the existing management practices in Organization of the Military Police of São Paulo, Brazil.