The ICG is not independent of the practices and events that occur in the business world. It is a part of the mechanisms that aim at improving the performance of corporations, financial institutions, and the well-being of the poor class of society in a globalized setting to eliminate poverty. Ginena (2014, p. 86) claims that the eruption of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis (GFC) placed the issue of corporate governance at the top of the policymakers’ agenda. In his words, “the worldwide economic and financial crisis that began in mid-2007 and included failures of several financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers, once a ‘heavyweight’ of investment banking, made the topic of corporate governance a chief concern for academics, governments, and regulators globally.” Even before the eruption of GFC, other actors intensified the importance of corporate governance. Indeed, Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) argue that some of these factors include the growth of institutional investors and their role in developed economies, the sub-optimal economic and social development in developed economies, the regulators’ interest to protect all stakeholders, and the liberalization of institutional investors’ activities. The research on ICG has become a prolifically productive area in the field of Islamic finance studies. Although it has very similar objectives vis-à-vis conventional corporate governance, the inclusion of shariah maxims and the originating fiqh principles renders ICG’s scope more restrictive about the religious, ethical, and social considerations of the Islamic financial institutions’ (IFIs) business activities. The ICG aims to combine the improvement of the financial performance with the social mission within the perimeter of shariah maxims, in order to achieve the best satisfaction of all stakeholders’ in a broader socio-economic setting. The complexity of the ICG process consists in the continuous accountability of the board of directors (BOD) (and the corresponding strategizing) to the jurisdiction’s law and regulations, alongside with shariah. Not only managers find it difficult to tailor such optimal accountability, but also regulators must exercise with care to maintain a balance between shariah compliance and the issues of sustaining financial stability and development. The theoretical model underpinnings of ICG and the related practical implications (in terms of profitability, earnings management, alleviation of shariah risk, efficient capital allocation, Islamic financial products (IFPs) development, etc.) are concerned with the maximization of joint interests for a variety of stakeholders