Abstract

Although determinants of life satisfaction in older adults have been well documented, research has to date failed to fully address the experience of older adults living in places with different levels of urbanization. Furthermore, there are conflictive findings regarding the type of residence environment that offers the greatest benefits for the wellbeing of older adults. Our study proposes an integrative research model to determine the nature of the relationships between loneliness, self-esteem and life satisfaction, with a particular focus on the living environment (rural-urban) of the older adults. Using a cross-sectional survey design volunteers (aged 60+) from rural (n = 198) and urban (n = 198) in Galicia (Spain) completed a questionnaire. Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) was used to test the relationships between loneliness, self-esteem and life satisfaction and multigroup analysis was performed to analyse the existence of differences in the relationships based on the area of residence of older adults. We found that higher levels of loneliness were a significant predictor of reduced life satisfaction and reduced self-esteem. Self-esteem not only increases life satisfaction, but also reduces the negative impact loneliness may have on it. Where the older adults lived had a significant effect on the relationships between loneliness, self-esteem and life satisfaction. The relationships were stronger for older adults living in urban areas. Differentiated policy initiatives should be considered, depending on the area of residence in order to increase the life satisfaction of older adults.

Introduction

In recent decades, the European Union (EU) has experienced two parallel processes: population aging and urbanization. The urban population rose from 58 % in 1960 to over 75 % in 2022 [1]. The proportion of population aged 65 and over stands at almost 21 % and forecasts suggest that in 2050, the old-age dependency ratio will exceed 52 % [2,3]. Within this process, a significant number of older adults live in urban areas, many of whom have relocated from rural environments, whilst others remain in their familiar surroundings in line with what is known as “aging in place”. In any case, the residential environment, whether rural or urban, poses various challenges for older adults [4].

Older adults’ quality of life is influenced by a large number of factors that range from social support and relationship networks to the environment, residence conditions, financial resources, older adults’ degree of activity, autonomy and independence when making decisions, as well as physical and mental health [5,6]. In fact, the World Health Organization’s quality-of-life scale, known as the WHOQOL-BREF questionnaire, includes 26 questions grouped into four domains: physical health, psychological health, social relationships and environmental health [7,8]. The environmental dimension of the WHOQOL-BREF questionnaire includes items designed to identify aspects including not only the home environment, opportunities for acquiring new information and skills and for recreation, the physical environment and transport, but also health and social care, security and, of course, financial resources.

Conclusions

The main aim of this study was to examine the association between loneliness, self-esteem and life satisfaction among older adults in Galicia (Spain), with a particular focus on the (rural-urban) residence environment of the older adults. The data support an association between these variables in the predicted direction and the results provide strong support to the theoretical model proposed.

Older adults’ life satisfaction depends significantly on loneliness. The greater the perceived loneliness, the lower the degree of life satisfaction. Loneliness also impacts significantly and negatively on self-esteem. In turn, self-esteem has a positive and significant influence on life satisfaction. Self-esteem not only increases life satisfaction, but it also reduced the negative impact of loneliness on life satisfaction.

Where older adults live had a significant effect on the relationship between loneliness, self-esteem and life satisfaction, which was stronger for older adults living in urban areas. These results may be partly explained by the slightly higher means for loneliness reported among urban older adults. Reported self-esteem mitigated the impact of loneliness on life satisfaction in older adults living in the city.

Abstract

     Systemic racism and discriminatory practices continue to disproportionally expose Black children and families to less than optimal health and economic resources. COVID-19 sheds existing light on how longstanding systemic inequalities affecting Black children and families create racial disparities in accessing material resources. The purpose of this study (N = 704 Black caregivers) is to better understand the relationship between experiences of racial discrimination, access to material resources (i.e., health-promoting resources and economic resources), and Black children’s behavioral functioning during the pandemic. Through the application of ordinary least squares regression analysis, we find that inadequate material resources (both health-related risks and economic hardship) during the pandemic were associated with heightened caregiver report that their child was frequently fussy or defiant (externalizing) and frequently anxious or fearful (internalizing). The study found no significant links between caregivers’ experiences of discrimination during the pandemic and children’s behavioral functioning. However, the study found a significant link between caregivers’ concern for their children’s experiences of discrimination and their children’s externalizing behaviors. Findings from this study offer an important contribution to understanding how factors rooted in systemic racism—access to material resources—and experiences of discrimination affect Black children’s well-being during COVID-19.

Introduction

     While countless studies demonstrate the positive relationship between access to material resources (e.g., health-promoting resources and economic resources) and children’s externalizing (e.g., impulsivity, noncompliance, and aggression) and internalizing (e.g., depression, anxiety, and social withdrawal) behaviors, there is a stark reality that access to these much-needed resources is differentially patterned across children and families of various racial and ethnic backgrounds. Inequities in material resources directly affect children’s early developmental outcomes (Duncan, Magnuson & Votruba-Drzal, 2015). For instance, difficulty paying for basic needs (e.g., food, housing, utilities, health care, etc.) and economic insecurity have also been linked to children’s externalizing and internalizing behaviors. Specifically, researchers note that developing in financially stressed environments has the potential to alter positive caregiver behaviors associated with children’s positive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral development (e.g., Longo, McPherran Lombardi & Dearing, 2017). Furthermore, health-related risks, conceptualized broadly to include threats such as mental health symptomology and lack of health insurance coverage, among both caregivers and children pose threats to children’s development. Caregiver depressive symptoms, which are heightened among families possessing low-income socioeconomic resources (Silva, Loureiro & Cardoso, 2016), have shown deleterious links with children’s behavioral functioning (e.g., Trapolini, McMahon & Ungerer, 2007). Additionally, children who lack health insurance coverage are more likely to experience delayed or unmet physician care, such as well-baby and well-child visits (Lave et al., 1998). When children miss well-baby or well-child visits, their caregivers also miss opportunities to receive support and guidance about their children’s behavioral and emotional functioning (Weitzman et al., 2015). These threats to children’s development are particularly pronounced during early childhood, when children’s biology and behavior are rapidly shaped by their environments and experiences (e.g., Shonkoff et al., 2012).

Conclusion

     Early childhood is a sensitive period for children’s development impacted by biological, neurological, and environmental contexts. However, not all children are afforded the same opportunities to meet their potential due to their socio-demographics (i.e., skin color, socioeconomic status). The findings from this study offer an important contribution to understanding how factors rooted in systemic racism—access to material resources (health-promoting resources and economic resources) — and experiences of discrimination, affect young Black children’s well-being during COVID-19, a global pandemic that disproportionately impacts Black children and their families and communities. While interventions in the early years cannot address all problems, especially problems due to historical racism, equitable opportunities during the first year of life could stymie disparities later in life.

     The structural determinants of early learning must be placed at the center of policy decision making to ensure equitable access, experiences, and outcomes for Black children and their families (Iruka, 2020). Addressing the challenges faced by young Black children and their families requires attending to social policies that impact their daily lives from housing, education, and labor, policies that impact families’ socioeconomic position and upward mobility. Families’ socioeconomic status greatly influences their access to resources, opportunities, time, and functioning to meet their children’s needs, critical in the early years (McLoyd, 1990). Families’ socioeconomic position also influences the experiences children have inside and outside the home, such as access to high quality early care and education and health care services. The findings from this study underscore the importance of delivering on the promise for Black children and their families as they remain resilience in the face of 2 pandemics – COVID-19 and racism.

Abstract

The rate of child abuse has sharply increased worldwide, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the media’s role in addressing child abuse cases is crucial, several international and formal organizations have established child abuse reporting guidelines. This study investigated how closely journalists follow reporting guidelines in addressing child abuse cases. Five major Korean presses and 189 articles from January 1, 2018, to January 31, 2021, were selected using the keyword “child abuse.” Each article was analyzed using a guideline framework consisting of 13 items regarding the five principles of the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare and Central Child Protection Agency reporting guidelines.

This study identified a radical growth in media reporting on child abuse cases in South Korea; almost 60% of the articles analyzed came from 2020 and 2021. More than 80% of the articles analyzed did not provide abuse resources, and 70% did not provide factual information. 57.1% of the articles instigated negative stereotypes, and about 30% explicitly mentioned certain family types in the headlines. Nearly 20% of the articles provided excessive details about the method used. Approximately 16% exposed victims’ identities. Some articles (7.9%) also described victims as sharing responsibility for the abuse.

Introduction

According to the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare (2020), the number of child abuse cases in South Korea has been increasing annually. Especially during the COVID-19 pandemic, the risk of child abuse has increased owing to the heightened stress and social isolation of children and their families (Rosenthal & Thompson, 2020). The number of child abuse cases has increased sharply in South Korea since the beginning of the pandemic. According to the Korean National Policy Agency (2020), the number of child abuse reports in families between February and March 2020 was 1558, up 13.8 % from 2019. Additionally, according to the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare’s (2022) analysis of child abuse cases in Korea the total number of reported child abuse cases tallied in 2021 was 53,932, a significant increase of about 27.6 % compared to the previous year.

Of the 37,605 cases judged as child abuse, the age range of 13–15 years accounted for the largest portion of victims with 8693 cases (23.1 %), followed by those aged 10–12 years with 8657 cases (23.0 %), and 7–9 years old with 7219 cases (19.2 %) (Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2022). In terms of family types of child abuse victims, 23,838 cases (63.4 %) occurred in families with biological parents, 4618 cases (12.3 %) in mother-and-child families, 3707 cases (9.9 %) in father-and-child families, and 1980 cases (5.3 %) in remarried families (Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2022). Regarding the relationship between assailants and victims, parents accounted for the highest number of cases, with 31,486 cases (83.7 %), followed by 3609 cases (9.6 %) involving surrogate caregivers, and 1517 cases (4.0 %) involving relatives (Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2022). Among the confirmed reports of child abuse, 45.1% were reported by fathers (16,944 cases), 35.6% by mothers (13,380 cases), and 3.2% by childcare teachers (1221 cases) (Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2022).

Conclusions

This study is meaningful because there is a lack of analysis on child abuse reporting guidelines in South Korea although the coverage of child abuse cases is increasing at an alarming rate. These findings indicate that the current guidelines have not been followed effectively. Our research urges the importance of avoiding detailed, biased, and sensational descriptions and providing factual information and abuse resources to enhance social awareness of child abuse and to prevent and intervene in child abuse cases. We expect our results to arouse attention toward establishing more realistic and effective child abuse reporting guidelines and monitoring systems.

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Integrated Data Exchanges: The Foundation of Smart Cities

3. Applying Governance Approaches to Provisioning IDE Services

4. Discussion: Governance and Sustainability of IDEs

5. Conclusion

References

Abstract

     Collecting, processing, and distributing information has always been a core function of government. This core function has evolved from the earliest ancient governments using clay tablets to today’s smart cities relying on integrated data exchanges (IDE). A smart city “uses information and information technology to make better decisions to improve the quality of life” (Nam and Pardo, 2011). The IDE framework builds upon the data platform literature (O’Reilly, Jan. 2011) by incorporating governance systems to manage a smart city’s activities. This conceptual paper takes existing research, synthesizes it, and creates a new framework to identify how cities can select the appropriate governance rules to facilitate the political, financial, and operational sustainability of their IDEs, and derivatively, their smart city efforts.

Introduction

     Managing information has always been a core function of government
Managing information has always been a core function of government. For example, one of the earliest civilizations in the world, the ancient city of Sumer in Mesopotamia (c. 4500 – c. 1900 BCE) (Anon Feb. 01, 2020) used cuneiform tablets (Anon Apr. 01, 2022) to record contracts and property transfers. In fact, most of the clay tablets that were unearthed, were used to support a public function. Some historians also believe that the expansion of these earliest empires critically depended on a code of law that could be communicated to the far-flung parts of the empire (e.g., the famous Hammurabi’s Code, 1758 BCE) (Charpin and Todd, 2010). Since then, new technologies have developed to improve the collection and distribution information, generating new challenges and opportunities for civilization and also how government should provide data and information1: including the printing press (Adelmann, Mar. 19, 2012) (McLuhan, 1962), the telegraph (Howe, 2007), the Internet (Castells, 2001), AI (Yigitcanlar et al., 2022) and block-chain (Tsampoulatidis et al., 2022). “Smart cities” are the latest conceptualization about how technology can improve government (Anthopoulos and Reddick, 2022) 2. Although by some accounts, the term has become a brand that businesses use to sell technologies (Smith and Prieto Martín, 2022), this study defines smart cities as those that “use information and information technology to make better decisions to improve the quality of life” (Nam and Pardo, 2011).

Conclusion

     If good public management is good decision-making (Simon, 1947), then information is the lifeblood of government. Creating, storing, and analyzing information is not only a core government function, but it is also foundational to the rest of society. As for government, evidence-based or data driven decision-making is key to be recognized as a “smart” city. Foundational to smart city efforts is an IDE to manage vast and disparate sources of information. One of the contributions of this study is defining an IDE and its role in curating, managing, and disseminating information.

     In constructing a conceptual framework for an IDE, dimensions of political sustainability, operational sustainability, and financial sustainability emerged. This study makes the argument that IDE sustainability may be dependent on different governance models: municipal, regional cooperative, and PPP. If an important goal is to use up-to-date technology to make sure that the city stays innovative, it makes more sense to have this function governed by public-private governance systems and their accompanying rules than to keep that within a municipal governance system. If, however, the strategic goal is to make sure that the public is actively involved in smart city efforts or to be transparent and accountable, a public governance system is more appropriate for those functions.

Abstract

     The digitalisation of production driven by new paradigms such as Industry 4.0, factories of the future and smart manufacturing, create new challenges as to how manufacturers and other supply chain actors would discharge their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. These new paradigms enable novel approaches like distributed and collaborative manufacturing. Manufacturers increasingly leverage digital technologies, such as 3D printing, cloud manufacturing and artificial intelligence, to provide customised products. Digital technologies also improve predictive and preventive maintenance on the shop floor and across the supply chain, increasing the overall resilience of manufacturing industries in times of crisis. This article proposes a blueprint of a collaborative, decentralised approach to human rights due diligence in digital supply chains. It argues that the pooling of human rights due diligence efforts in manufacturing industries could have network-wide effects of incentivising value chain actors to also collaborate on providing collective remedy.

Introduction

     The manufacturing of a modern aircraft, like an Airbus A321, is the result of highly efficient cooperation across complex, tightly integrated global supply and manufacturing chains. The process starts with the design and engineering, through production and transport of aircraft sections, to final assembly and tests, certification and delivery to the customer. Growing demand in air travel in the past few decades has naturally increased the production needs. At the same time, fast-paced developments in the information and communications technology (ICT) industry have offered new ways of optimising manufacturing. As a result, the supply chain of modern aircraft production no longer consists of just raw materials, such as steel, aluminium, titanium and their alloys. The deployment of smart sensors on the shop floor and the utilization of automated systems means that supply chains now include also digital assets, such as datasets, computer simulations, digital twins and pre-trained machine learning models.

     New models of manufacturing are enabled by concepts like distributed, collaborative and additive manufacturing. At the same time, they also create distinct challenges as to how manufacturers and the various actors in their supply chains could discharge their corporate responsibility to respect human rights. It has become widely accepted that businesses do have a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (‘Guiding Principles’) promote this responsibility as a global standard of expected conduct from business enterprises, regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership or structure.1 Thus, from manufacturers to service-providing enterprises, all actors in the value chain are subject to the same responsibility.2 In this sense, the corporate responsibility to respect human rights applies equally to enterprises engaged in traditional manufacturing as well as those in smart manufacturing driven by the developments in so-called Industry 4.0.

Conclusion

     Collaborative smart manufacturing in Industry 4.0 represents a significant shift in the convention manufacturing paradigm. The vertical and horizontal integration of actors in the supply chain leads to the emergence of new business relationships entailing new potential adverse human rights impacts. It is beyond doubt that business entities have a corporate responsibility to respect human rights. A main tool to discharge this responsibility, human rights due diligence is premised on the idea that it is within the business enterprise’s control to prevent or mitigate human rights impacts at the beginning of a new business relationship or activity. This assumption, however, is challenged by technological and organisational processes within Industry 4.0 which are based on complex real-time network interactions and data-driven autonomous decision-making. In this new collaborative environment, the manufacturer becomes one of many actors in a network, along with the customer. This gives rise to new potential aggregate adverse human rights impacts at the level of the ecosystem which cannot be sufficiently addressed by any single actor alone.

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Literature review

3. Empirical framework

4. Empirical findings

5. Conclusion and discussion

Disclosure statement

Notes on contributors

References

Abstract

     The aim of the present study is to reveal the causal effects of Smart City policies on urban innovation. Using the panel data harvested from 103 cities in China, the constructed sample was analysed rigorously based on the combination of the strength of Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Differences (DID). As suggested by the empirical results, Smart City policies indeed positively and significantly impact urban innovation . Besides, whether policy effects vary with the regional location and city scale is explored; the results reveal that the impact is significantly positive only for the megacities as well as cities in central China.

Introduction

     Since the late 1990s, smart city projects have been rolled out globally. According to Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu’s report (Deloitte, 2018), the constructions of over 1,000 smart cities have been launched worldwide with 500 policy pilot areas in China, which noticeably outclasses Europe’s 90 of the second place. The mentioned projects are capable of not only enhancing the intelligence of specific socio-economic aspects of daily life, but also presenting a considerable number of other benefits, which cover fostering a competitive economy (Giffinger & Haindl, 2010), boosting more feasible governance (Nam & Pardo, 2011), expediting the innovation process (Paskaleva, 2011; Schaffers et al., 2012), advancing social capital (Hodgkinson, 2011), protecting diversity and individuality (Lind, 2012), etc. Nevertheless, some have argued that the potentials or benefits of smart cities have been overestimated; they considered that smart cities may not be as ‘smart’ as their name suggests (Hollands, 2008). Though considerable capitals have been invested in the advancement of smart cities, smart cities have not achieved their original goals (Yigitcanlar & Lee, 2014). Numerous risks also exist in the application of smart city strategies, e.g., the digital divide resulting from unequal use of ICT (Coe et al., 2001), the replication of technology solutions (Townsend et al., 2010), the overlook of city’s requirements and priorities (Caragliu & Del Bo, 2019), the slow progression attributed to budgetary issues and inadequate planning (Shwayri, 2013), etc.

Conclusion and discussion

     The present paper aims to evidence whether Smart City policies make cities more innovative – in the case of Chinese cities. To accurately estimate the policy effect, Propensity Score Matching (PSM) and Difference-in-Differences (DID) are integrated to eliminate some biases that might affect the effectiveness of this study. To be specific, PSM technique is adopted to construct the matched control group that possesses similar observable city characteristics with treatment group. Subsequently, DID approach is employed to estimate the differences of those groups’ treatment effects before and after the policy implementation. Besides, our results comply with several existing studies (Caragliu & Del Bo, 2019; Veeckman & Graaf, 2014), revealing that Smart City policies indeed stimulate urban innovation. Though innovative is not a major objective of implementation of Smart City policies, our findings have demonstrated a positive spill-over effect of the policies on urban innovation. Compared with similar non-pilot cities, pilot cities of smart city policy are granted more patents.

Abstract

Introduction

What are smart cities?

Methodology

Analysis of smart city initiatives

Comparing PSI in HK and SG

Discussion

Conclusion

Acknowledgements

References

Abstract

     Since the 2000s, Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore (SG) have been working to reinvent themselves as smart cities. Despite their similarities, SG has consistently ranked ahead of HK on several smart city indices. To explain this gap, the smart city initiatives of both cities were categorized using a six-factor typology of public sector innovation. Further analysis indicated that SG was ahead of HK because its government has been more aggressive in funding and fostering innovation. This paper suggests that a government’s financial support for public sector innovation, as well as its ability to redirect resources within the public sector and get citizens involved, will catalyse transformational efforts into a smart city.

Introduction

     The cities of Hong Kong (HK) and Singapore (SG) are often compared as a result of their similarities—a colonial history (Kratoska, 2006; Onimaru, 2019; Tan, 1997), values and culture (Chia et al., 2007), relatively high levels of human development (Delang & Yu, 2015; Ramesh & Holliday, 2001), strong economic competitiveness (Li et al., 2013; Schwab, 2018), as well as being two of the four ‘Asian tigers’ and important regional transport and financial hubs (Huat et al., 2004; Jarvis, 2011; Woo, 2015). The IMD World Competitiveness Center ranked HK at third place in 2018, second in 2019, and fifth in 2020; SG was ranked second in 2018, and first in both 2019 and 2020. A separate ranking by the Global Competitiveness Report ranked HK at fourth place in 2018, third in 2019; while SG ranked second in 2018 and first in 2019 (at the time of writing, rankings were not available for 2020). Overall, the two cities are very close rivals in global rankings of governance and development, and they are in competition for foreign investment and global talent.

     Although SG and HK have been relatively close rivals in various areas, SG has consistently ranked ahead of HK on indices related to smart cities. These include the IMD Smart City Index 2020 which ranked SG first and HK 32nd, the Global Innovation Index 2020 where SG ranked eighth and HK ranked 11th (Cornell University, INSEAD, and WIPO, 2020), and the IESE Cities in Motion Index 2019 which ranked SG ranked seventh and HK 11th (Berrone et al., 2019). The disparity is curious, especially since the governments of both cities had been proactively seeding and steering various initiatives to transform them into smart cities.

Conclusion

     Both HK and SG need to thrive economically, while ensuring sustainable development and building up capital for the future. While the two cities are unique, one would expect more similarities in their global standing as smart cities. The comparison of the two cities in this paper sheds light on how PSI and governance has affected the development of the cities. Smart city initiatives often require support from both the public and private sectors. Both the design and delivery of public services need to change, so innovation needs to come from within the public sector. Using private sector resources and funding, the SG government has been more effective than HK in creating a smart city. However, it has also been more exposed to criticism when initiatives have failed. The paper shows that the development of smart cities is also accompanied by new challenges, such as the risk of cyber-attacks and citizens’ reluctance to use new technologies. Governments need to be prepared to handle these challenges. Future studies should examine how well the governments of smart cities have adapted and innovated in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Abstract

Open Access and Permissions

Share and Cite

Article Metrics

Author Biographies

Order Article Reprints

Abstract

Austrian family law stands out in Europe because, in Austria, fault-based divorce is still legally valid. In these divorces, the suing partner attempts to prove in court that the other partner is at fault for the breakdown of the marriage. Thus, proving in court that a relationship is deficient in order to obtain a divorce is a common family transition practice in Austria. In this contribution, I seek to identify the practices that are associated with fault divorce proceedings and look at how these practices are related to normative and legal ideas of marriage. Based on a qualitative multiple case study, I analysed 17 fault divorce lawsuits filed by heterosexual couples in the 2014–2016 period. To do so, I used situational analysis, trans-sequential analysis, and an analytical framework that was developed within the research project. The spouses’ involvement in the proceedings relied on two main approaches: First, the divorce was justified by an event that was disruptive enough to ‘keep things short’. These narratives were related to the divorce grounds explicitly mentioned in family law. Second, the divorce was justified through narratives of a ‘normal’ marriage that became a ‘bad’ marriage over time. These narratives relied upon characterisations of the other spouse as deficient. These deficiencies were related to normative expectations associated with particular life stages and gendered life course trajectories and mirrored the nuclear family ideal.

1. Introduction

In recent decades, the relationship patterns and perceptions of divorce in Western societies have changed (Raley and Sweeney 2020; Perelli-Harris and Lyons-Amos 2015; Amato 2010), and these changes are also reflected in family law (Kreyenfeld and Trappe 2020). Whereas just a few decades ago, a divorce was seen as a disruptive event that was the fault of individual partners, and thus the last phase in the evolution of a family, there has been a shift in the social and scientific perspectives on divorce, starting in the early 2000s (Smart 2004; Kitson 2006). Since this shift, divorce has generally been seen as one transition in the course of multiple transitions in a family’s evolution that reorganises family relations and can lead to the divorced spouses forming new partnerships and remarrying (Amato 2010). Even though there appeared to be a slight backlash against liberal attitudes towards divorce in most European countries after the early 2000s, these overall changes in recent decades have been reflected in family law. Thus, in most European countries today, fault-based divorce has been abolished (Kreyenfeld and Trappe 2020).

Together with a few other countries, Austria stands out in Europe with regard to family law because, in Austria, fault divorce is still legally valid (for an overview, see Antokolskaia 2016; Zartler 2013). This means that a partner whose spouse does not agree with the decision to divorce either has to wait until the couple has been separated for six years to obtain a legal divorce or has to file for a fault divorce. In the latter case, the initiating partner has to prove to the court that the other spouse has failed to fulfil his or her marital obligations. The law states that a fault divorce can be granted ‘if the other [partner] has culpably disrupted the marriage through serious misconduct or through dishonourable or immoral behaviour to such an extent that the restoration of a normal marital union cannot be expected’ (Ehegesetz 1999).

1- Introduction

2- Data and methods

3- Results

4- Discussion and conclusions

References

Abstract

In the past 15 years, Tanzania has made considerable progress in the fight against child undernutrition. This paper analyses in what respects an enabling environment for nutrition action in Tanzania has emerged. It critically investigates the nature of government political commitment and assesses the breadth and depth of a range of public policies, initiatives and actions within and across nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive sectors, and at the national, sub-national and community levels. It finds that Tanzania has undertaken substantial policy innovation and institutional development, carrying significant promise to accelerate nutrition improvements, provided they are accompanied by stronger domestic investments, and greater political space enabling communities to hold the government to account for its performance combating malnutrition.

Introduction

During the past 15 years, Tanzania has made considerable progress in the fight against child undernutrition. Stunting levels for children under five years of age have seen gradual declines, from nationwide averages of 48 per cent in 1999, to 44 per cent in 2005, and to 34 per cent in 2015 (Government of Tanzania, 2016). A recent re-analysis of the Demographic and Health Survey data suggests that official figures are underreporting the achievements, finding stunting levels to have declined to 30 per cent in 2015 (Headey et al., 2019). This downward trend is replicated among neighbouring countries’ under-five stunting rates, with Malawi, Kenya and Uganda exhibiting similar reductions. For example, between 2003 and 2014, Kenya’s under-five stunting rate declined from 36 per cent to 26 per cent (Government of Kenya, 2015). Faster declines over a similar period were noted in South East Asia, where Nepal experienced a reduction in stunting level of 21 per cent between 2001 and 2016 (Government of Nepal et al., 2017) and Cambodia a decline of 18 per cent over a 14 year period (Government of Cambodia et al., 2015). These figures have contributed to the overall global reduction in stunting, with levels falling by more than 10 per cent, from 33 per cent in 2000 to 22 per cent in 2017 (UNICEF et al., 2018). Several studies have sought to explain the reduction of stunting in Tanzania by exploring the drivers of improved nutritional status, with notable attention given to the positive role of better access to general health interventions, wealth gains and strengthened education of mothers (Masanja et al., 2008; Semali et al., 2015). Using a decomposition analysis to quantify the empirical drivers of positive change in underfives’ height-for-age, Headey et al. (2019) find dramatic increases in infants’ birth size to be the most significant factor, attributed to, in order of significance, improved maternal health monitoring, malaria prevention, HIV infection testing and improved water and sanitation facilities. However, overall, relatively little has been reported on the role of the enabling environment for nutrition action in Tanzania. This paper hence seeks to investigate the ways in which changes in the enabling environment may have underpinned the contributions of determinant factors towards declining stunting rates. Gillespie et al. (2013, p. 553) define enabling environments as the ‘political and policy processes that build and sustain momentum for the effective implementation of actions that reduce undernutrition’. Drawing upon this definition, we examine the role that the Government of Tanzania has played. The study thus adds to a portfolio of country case studies documenting the mechanisms by which nutrition has improved over the past 15 years in several countries as part of the Stories of Change in Nutrition project (Gillespie and Van den Bold, 2017; Harris et al., 2017; Kampman et al., 2017; Nisbett et al., 2017).

1- Introduction

2- Background

3-Data

4- Methodology

5- Results

6- Conclusion

References

Abstract

This study identifies the impact of access to and the speed of divorce on the welfare of children in a middle income largely Catholic country. Using difference-in-difference estimation techniques, I compare school enrollment for children of married and cohabiting parent households before and after the legalization of divorce. Implementing pro-homemaker divorce laws increased school enrollment anywhere from 3.4 to 5.5 percentage points, and the effect was particularly salient on secondary school students. I provide evidence that administrative processes influencing the speed of divorce affect household bargaining and investments in schooling. With every additional six months wait to the finalization of divorce, school enrollment decreased by approximately one percentage point. The impact almost doubles for secondary schooling. When contemplating development policies, advocates, policymakers, and leaders should not overlook the impact changes in family policies and administrative processes can have on advancements in child welfare and, ultimately, economic development. (JEL: D12, D13, J12, I21, I25).

Introduction

Implementing development policies focused on improving child welfare can be expensive, time consuming, and, sometimes, ineffective (Filmer, 2003; Glewwe and Kremer, 2006; Ingram and Kessides, 1994). This is particularly true if the intervention is country-wide and focused on major activities like building infrastructure, purchasing supplies, or developing advocacy groups (Ingram and Kessides, 1994). Can alternative policy paths like changes to family law lead to major advancements in child welfare and, eventually, economic development? To study this, one needs a rarefied environment where a national policy is implemented with enough leverage to induce a redistribution of household resources in certain households, restrict the household’s ability to manipulate the magnitude or speed of the redistribution, and data overtime of those exposed and not exposed to the policy to estimate outcomes. I find a natural experiment environment close to this in Chile where gendered family norms are relatively rigid, geographic immobility is common, family legal procedures are tied to the local geography where one lives, local family court districts are independent, and a major policy shock – the legalization of divorce – happened in 2004. After almost a decade of intense national debate, the Chilean Congress passed a revised Civil Marriage Act in 2004. For the first time in the country’s history, Chileans could divorce.