Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking centre stage in economic growth and business operations alike. Public discourse about the practical and ethical implications of AI has mainly focussed on the societal level. There is an emerging knowledge base on AI risks to human rights around data security and privacy concerns. A separate strand of work has highlighted the stresses of working in the gig economy. This prevailing focus on human rights and gig impacts has been at the expense of a closer look at how AI may be reshaping traditional workplace relations and, more specifically, workplace health and safety. To address this gap, we outline a conceptual model for developing an AI Work Health and Safety (WHS) Scorecard as a tool to assess and manage the potential risks and hazards to workers resulting from AI use in a workplace. A qualitative, practice-led research study of AI adopters was used to generate and test a novel list of potential AI risks to worker health and safety. Risks were identified after cross-referencing Australian AI Ethics Principles and Principles of Good Work Design with AI ideation, design and implementation stages captured by the AI Canvas, a framework otherwise used for assessing the commercial potential of AI to a business. The unique contribution of this research is the development of a novel matrix itemising currently known or anticipated risks to the WHS and ethical aspects at each AI adoption stage.

Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) has given rise to a new type of machine, a prediction machine, which can automate cognitive tasks traditionally associated with white-collar workers. These smart machines are lowering the cost and effort of making accurate predictions in operational processes. The AI technology may thus have potential benefits, such as increasing productivity, streamlining processes, and integrating value chains. Advocates of AI maintain that companies that do not take advantage of these benefits risk being driven out of the marketplace by others that do. As human expertise is being outperformed by AI, companies may prefer delivering their products and services, internally as well as externally, with the help of AI. The impact that such operational and logistical change in the workplaces may have on workers, however, remains uncertain.

Sociologists of work have long argued that workplace technologies are a key instrument of social change, reshaping labour relations and introducing new systems of worker discipline and control (Barley 1988; Braverman 1974; Kellogg et al. 2020; Zuboff 1988). From this critical sociological perspective, AI technologies in the workplace represent a new, contested domain for workers, raising questions around job security, worker autonomy, and worker status for which there is yet no clear social consensus. There is emerging research evidence on the qualitative impacts of AI on workers in specific industries, particularly insecure workers in the gig economy (Myhill et al. 2020; Convery et al. 2020). While the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 has, at least temporarily, normalized flexible and remote work, many firms had already integrated complex, networked technologies integrating AI even before the pandemic to deliver products and services across borders and time zones, and to deploy skilled workers in more effective ways. The rise of networked technologies and “digital first” business strategy played out in the global economic context of increasingly precarious forms of employment, unequal wage growth, the transformation of manufacturing, and a growing income and skills divide in the workforce leading to reduced economic and social mobility. These outcomes are not inevitable, but are the result of personal, economic and political decisions (Srnicek and Williams 2016; Benanav 2020). Whether the new technologies adversely affect the security and wellbeing of employees in a workplace is above all a question of whether they are permitted to do so, or whether instead these risks are contained by regulation and oversight.

Conclusion

A growing use of AI will change economies, the manufacturing of goods and delivery of services. It will also affect human relations at a societal level, including how we collect, use fairly and keep safe the data that drive AI. Whilst much of the debate of the ethical use of AI has focussed on the societal level, AI also has profound implications in and for the workplaces where it is being used. These workplaces are currently and in most industrial and late-industrial nations regulated by WHS guidelines, rules and prescriptions, which rarely address the specific impact of AI on processes, job roles, and communication among employees, and between employees and managers.

In this paper, we have outlined a model for detecting risks and hazards that AI may bring to workplaces, using a set of AI Ethics Principles, as endorsed by the Australian Government, and the AI Canvas, a technical stages model of AI implementation. The explorative process commenced with a review of the literature on AI risks and hazards as they may apply to workplaces. These potential risks and hazards were further explored in consultation with AI experts, professionals and users—a process that also helped to populate the risk assessment matrix with examples of workplace specific AI risks and hazards. These risk examples were further developed and validated during consultations with AI adopters and WHS professionals. Each of these risks and hazards was linked to statutory WHS principles as advocated by SWA, the Australian WHS regulators and oversight agency.

1- Introduction

2- Metallurgical effects and mechanisms of brittle fracture

3- Current international regulations on brittle fracture

4- Proposal for new material selection design rules in AS 4100, NZS 3404.1 and AS/NZS 5100.6

5- Comparison of the proposed selection criteria with Australian and New Zealand requirements

6- Conclusion

References

Abstract

This paper develops a new method to select steel grades manufactured to Australian and New Zealand standards. The current materials selection procedure is currently given in the design standards AS 4100, NZS 3404.1 and AS/NZS 5100.6, which is based on test data on the notch toughness characteristics from a previous generation of steel products originally manufactured in Australia or New Zealand. The existing procedure is limited to temperatures down to −40 °C. Moreover, it does not consider the effect of welding, detailing, stress utilisation, seismic loading rates, defects and other important factors. This paper includes a critical review of other international material selection procedures, before preparing a new design method based on fracture mechanics. The method extends the temperature range down to −120 °C, which is much lower than considered in many other international standards. It also includes New Zealand specific requirements for seismic loading rates. In comparison with the new method, it is demonstrated that the current materials selection procedure is much more conservative for plate thickness up to 75 mm for non-seismic design. The paper presents selection tables that can be considered for the development of new brittle fracture provisions for future versions of the Australian and New Zealand steel structures design standards.

Nature of brittle fracture

A brittle fracture is defined as fracture with little, or no plastic deformation of the failed component. It can be initiated by an overload of a cross-section in combination with material properties and/or geometrical allocation of the stresses (i.e. triaxiality of stresses due to the structural detail). The plastic deformation capability is essential for the avoidance of brittle fracture. It can be affected by: hardening in the weld heat affected zone; triaxiality of stress caused by the design of the structural detail; higher strain rates (e.g. during seismic events); or by neutron embrittlement. Another consideration is the possible inhomogeneity of the material, caused by sulphide inclusions leading to reduced mechanical properties in the through-thickness direction of the material. Other considerations include the loading imposed during fabrication and in service, design load, weld shrinkage and alignment at fabrication, erection stresses caused by poor fit-up, stresses by possible displacements of abutments and loadings caused by seismic events. In the design office, usually only stresses due to design loads are verified by calculation. The other stresses (e.g. residual stresses from shrinkage), are covered by the assurance of a plastic deformation capacity. That assurance is of equal importance as the numerical verification by calculation.

1- Introduction

2- Data

3- Empirical strategy

4- Results

5- Conclusion

References

Abstract

Using 12 waves of longitudinal data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey, we examine the relationship between transport poverty and subjective wellbeing. To measure transport poverty, we use indicators that reflect transport affordability and accessibility. Our preferred two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates, which instrument for transport poverty using NYSE Arca Oil Stock Prices and OPEC oil supply (in millions of barrels), suggest that a standard deviation increase in transport poverty is associated with a decline in subjective wellbeing between 0.318 and 0.544 standard deviations. This general finding is robust to alternative ways of measuring transport poverty, alternative estimation approaches, alternative approaches to addressing endogeneity of transport poverty, and holds irrespective of whether subjective wellbeing is measured using the single-item overall life satisfaction scale or composite scales such as the Mental Health Inventory (MHI-5) scale or the Kessler Psychological Distress Scale (K10).

Introduction

Subjective wellbeing refers to judgments by an individual of his or her satisfaction with their life, feelings of happiness and sadness, as well as other negative and positive emotions (Diener, 1984; Kahneman et al., 1999). Subjective wellbeing has been linked to a broad range of positive outcomes, most notably good physical health, rewarding personal relationships, strong work engagement and longevity among others (see, Diener et al., 2017; Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). Improving subjective wellbeing has become an important policy objective in many countries with some suggesting that the ultimate goal of government should be to improve the wellbeing, happiness and quality of life of its citizens, rather than focus on more conventional economic indicators, such as economic growth (Diener, 2000, 2006; Kahn and Juster, 2002). In Australia, the country in which we situate our study, one survey shows that 77% of Australians believe that the prime objective of government should be to maximize people’s happiness, rather than maximize the country’s wealth (Hamilton and Rush, 2006). Transport poverty encompasses various deprivations relating to transport access and affordability (Mattioli et al., 2017). The term has been used synonymously with other transport-related concepts, such as car economic stress, transport disadvantage, transportrelated social exclusion, transport accessibility and transport affordability among others (see, Currie et al., 2009; Hine and Mitchell, 2017; Lucas et al., 2016, 2018; Preston and Rajé, 2007; Xia et al., 2016).

A primary contention of evolutionary models of the Dark Triad traits (i.e., narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism) is that they are adaptations for dealing with adverse socioecological circumstances. In this study (N = 557), we collected data from two countries that differ in socioecological conditions (i.e., Turkey and Australia). We measured perceptions of a dangerous and competitive world and individual differences in the Dark Triad traits. Turkish participants were higher in the Dark Triad traits than Australian participants were. All the Dark Triad traits were correlated with a competitive but not a dangerous worldview. Country-level differences in the Dark Triad traits were mediated by competitive worldviews, but not dangerous worldviews, and those effects were similar in each sex. And rates of narcissism depended on participant’s sex and country. This study provided the first attempt to understand country-level differences in the Dark Triad traits using a life history framework.

Researchers have grown considerably interested in three related, aversive personality traits, known as the Dark Triad, composed of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. Narcissism is characterized by a sense of grandiosity, egotism, self-orientation, and lack of empathy (Turner & Webster, 2018), Machiavellianism is associated with manipulative behavior, self-interest, exploitation of others, and a ruthless lack of morality (Jones, 2016), and psychopathy is linked with reckless, cruel and callous attitudes, antisocial selfish behavior, and a lack of empathic skill and remorse (Cale & Lilienfeld, 2002). One reason for the considerable interest in these traits was their integration into a life history paradigm (Jonason, Koenig, & Tost, 2010). However, few studies have examined the role of context in predicting individual differences in the Dark Triad traits (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). This is essential because life history theory is about how organisms solve their adaptive tasks within some socioecology; that is, it is inherently interactionist. Particularly difficult environments may activate decisionmaking heuristics in people’s brains that recalibrate their default slow response to the world (Mace, 2000) towards a faster solution as seen in individual differences in the Dark Triad traits. In this study, we sampled participants from Australia and Turkey to test a condition-dependent hypothesis of the Dark Triad traits. While the countries might be economically tied (Turner, 2018), they differ in terms of the safety and competitiveness their citizens experience. Australia is the 13th safest country in in the world, whereas Turkey is 149th (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018).

Making space and place for innovation and knowledge-intensive activities has been an important task for urban administrators in order to foster, attract and retain talent and investment in the age of global knowledge economy. The paper sets out to derive the efficient approaches for practical integration of place making as a multidimensional strategy for the successful and sustainable generation and dissemination of knowledge in contemporary knowledge and innovation spaces. This research embraces a multidimensional conceptual framework to carry out the investigation in three case studies from Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane (Australia). As the methodological approach an interview-based qualitative analysis method, by involving a range of key stakeholders, is adopted. The study finds that, considering the challenges these locations are exposed to, the role of place making extends from merely physical aspects to holistic economic, social, cultural, spatial and organisational outcomes. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by generating insights from the Australian knowledge and innovation space context with the application of an innovative multifaceted approach for fruitful place making.

Introduction

Place making is increasingly manifesting itself as a popular strategy adopted by the competitive cities for retaining talent force in order to sustain creativity and knowledge generation in their blooming spatial assemblages of innovation and knowledge-intensive activities and functions (Edvardsson et al., 2016; Yigitcanlar, 2009). These locations—better known in the literature as knowledge precincts, knowledge locations, and innovation clusters or districts—are referred as knowledge and innovation spaces (KISs) in this paper. Incorporating multifaceted developmental motives, KISs are seen as the growth engines aimed at holistic and sustainable growth in terms of economy, society, governance and environment (Carrillo et al., 2014; Van Winden et al., 2013; Yigitcanlar et al., 2008a). However, these globalised knowledge-nurturing locations—in addition to the retainment of talent force—are facing a number of economic, social, political and environmental challenges (Baum et al., 2009; Florida, 2005; Peck, 2010). Interestingly, despite acknowledgement of place making as a strategic solution and its multidimensional definition—as accentuated by recent studies—knowledge regarding the applicable approaches for its practical integration in KISs remains an understudied subject. This research gap widens further considering the mentioned challenges unique to KISs (Carvalho and Winden, 2017; Pancholi et al., 2014; Yigitcanlar et al., 2008b, 2017a). This study aims to explore planning and policy approaches for place making as a strategic solution for complex challenges of contemporary KISs. The research question, thus, is: ‘How can place making be integrated as a strategy to combat the challenges of KISs?’ This paper places case studies of three leading Australian KISs—Macquarie Park (MQP), Melbourne Employment Cluster (MEC), and Dutton Park Knowledge Precinct (DPKP)—located in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane under the microscope. An interview-based qualitative method is adopted as the methodological approach, and findings are presented in line with a multidimensional conceptual framework of place making.

Innovation has been the main driver of economic growth as it plays an increasingly central role in firm performance. Incentivising innovation by governments is essential to stimulate investment by companies, covering part of their R & D costs, and minimising their financial risks. There is, however, limited understanding of how innovation incentives are perceived by the companies. This paper examines the perceptions of technology firms, and the views of key actors about public incentive schemes for innovation in Australia and Brazil. The study finds that: (a) Direct incentives are perceived as critical for increasing innovation capabilities of firms; (b) Where tax incentive and infrastructure development schemes are the most preferred incentive programs among the firms; (c) However, despite the former two findings, effectiveness of existing incentive programs has been marginal in fostering innovation significantly in the studied countries. These findings imply that Australian and Brazilian governments should further focus on the design, promotion, and delivery methods of the innovation support mechanisms.

Introduction

Today’s most advanced economies are fundamentally knowledgebased (Baum et al., 2009; Carrillo et al., 2014; Dunning, 2000). As Burton (1999) indicates, under the knowledge capitalism the gap between rich and poor countries is rapidly expanding; where knowledgeintensity is also leading to a growing gap within our societies. Promoting innovation through research and development (R & D) is seen as a useful method to narrow this gap (Byun et al., 2017; Yun et al., 2016). Many scholars see innovation as the main driver to establish a competitive edge and generate economic growth (Cooke and Leydesdorff, 2006; Pancholi et al., 2014, 2015). The growing dependency of wealth creation on intangibles is making the global economy more fluid and volatile, and the capacity to access and combine new and existing knowledge effectively for innovation has become highly important for the competitiveness of firms, cities/regions, and nations (Huggins, 2011; Lonnqvist et al., 2014; Wolfe and Bramwell, 2008). Innovation provides a company with a relative advantage over the competition (Betz, 2003). Beyond an advantage, particularly in the global knowledge economy, for many firms innovation is the key to survival (Doran and Ryan, 2012). Since innovation leads to more innovation, firms that invest in R & D and build technological and organisational capabilities are likely to induce further innovation (Baumol, 2002). However, stated by Guan & Yam (2015, p.273), “investors are usually anxious to obtain quick and safe returns on their investments, and the high R & D costs and risks involved in research keep many investors away”. Therefore, government innovation support mechanisms—such as government regulations, grants, subsidies or other financial incentives—are critical for many firms to invest in innovation generating activities (Leiblein and Madsen, 2009; Scotchmer, 2004). The governments of OECD member countries fund about 30% of R & D expenditure by companies in their countries (Thomson and Jensen, 2013).

Smart cities have become a popular concept because they have the potential to create a sustainable and livable urban future. Smart mobility forms an integral part of the smart city agenda. This paper investigates “smart mobility” from the angle of sustainable commuting practices in the context of smart cities. This paper studies a multivariate multiple regression model within a panel data framework and examines whether increasing access to broadband Internet connections leads to the choice of a sustainable commuting mode in Australian local government areas. In this case, access to the Internet is used as a proxy for determining urban smartness, and the use of different modes of transport including working at home is used to investigate sustainability in commuting behavior. The findings show that an increasing access to broadband Internet reduces the level of working from home, public transport use, and active transport use, but increases the use of private vehicles, perhaps to overcome the fragmentation of work activities the Internet creates. How to overcome the need for car-based travel for fragmented work activities while increasing smartness through the provisioning of broadband access should be a key smart city agenda for Australia to make its cities more sustainable.

Introduction

The concept, “smart city,” has become almost ubiquitous both in academia and in policy circles due to its potential to address a range of negative effects of rapid urbanization (e.g., congestion, CO2 emissions), industrialization (e.g., air and soil pollution) and consumerism practices (Mahbub et al., 2011; Wiig, 2015; Taamallah et al., 2017; Trindade et al., 2017). While a number of scholars and smart city sceptics raise their concerns about the ongoing global smart city movement (Yigitcanlar and Lee, 2014; Kunzmann, 2015; Angelidou, 2017), many levels of government—local, regional, state, national, and supra national—across the globe still continue to jump on the smart cities bandwagon (Townsend, 2013; Komninos, 2016). Due to diverse disciplinary and sectoral perspectives, there is no common consensus on the definition of smart cities (Angelidou, 2014; Albino et al., 2015). However, these cities are generally seen as localities that effectively utilize strategic planning approaches and innovative solutions to improve the quality of life of their communities, including ecological, cultural, political, institutional, social, and economic components (Neirotti et al., 2014; Yigitcanlar, 2016). Smart cities are also an umbrella concept that contain various sub-elements, ranging from smart economy to smart living, smart governance to smart people, and smart mobility to smart environment (Lee et al., 2014; Lara et al., 2016; Chang et al., 2018). Because emissions generated from transport causes about a quarter to one-third of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, smart mobility forms an integral part of the smart city agenda (Creutzig et al., 2015; Yigitcanlar, 2015; Arbolino et al., 2017). The smart mobility concept, in the fashionable sense, is defined as “integrating the sustainable and smart vehicular technologies, and the cooperative-ITS [intelligent transport systems], accelerated with the cloud-server and big-data based vehicular networks” (Kim et al., 2015, p.59). Similarly, Chun and Lee (2015) see smart mobility as a comprehensive and smarter future traffic service in combination with smart technology. However, in the traditional sense, smart mobility is basically all about reducing congestion, greenhouse gases, and other vehicular emissions, and fostering faster, greener, and cheaper transportation options (Spinney et al., 2009). Moving smartly surely depends on an efficient means of active and public transport systems having a low environmental impact, a network of safe and continuous cycle lanes and walkways, and interchange parking that avoids city congestion (Yigitcanlar and Kamruzzaman, 2014, 2015; Chun and Lee, 2015). In other words, mobility cannot be considered “smart” if it is not also sustainable (Yigitcanlar et al., 2015; Garau et al., 2016).

2- LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS

3- RESEARCH DESIGN

4- RESULTS

5- CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

CONCLUSION

This study examines the effects of audit partner busyness on the cost of equity capital. Following the notion of corporate governance research on “busy director”, we use the busyness hypothesisto argue that the time and effort of an individual are finite. Thus, serving too many audit clients, and hence the associated task commitments, may result in poor audit performance, which increases information risk and, therefore, the cost of capital. We find support for this view, but only for the firm‐year observations audited by non‐Big 4 audit firms. We also argue that financial reporting quality mediates the effects of audit partner busyness on the cost of equity capital and find results that are supportive of this prediction as well. However, our documented association of an adverse effect of audit partner busyness on earnings quality contradicts Goodwin and Wu (2016), who found no significant association between partner busyness and earnings quality. Although our results are consistent with recent evidence from the emerging markets, we caution readers not to extrapolate our inference to all listed firms on the Australian Securities Exchange, based on our restricted sample only. Future research needs to further investigate the generalizability of Goodwin and Wu (2016) by investigating the mediating effect of financial reporting quality on, for example, stock price crash risk, which would be amenable to a larger sample size. Future research should also examine factors that determine an auditor’s decision to select potential clients in Australia. Existing research on this issue is mainly survey based and uses data from the USA. For example, Johnstone and Bedard (2003) suggested that auditors assess financial risk, audit risk, and auditor business risk, and consider whether engagement fees are sufficient to cover current and future expected engagement costs when selecting potential clients.

The quality of service monitoring forms a key element of the current light-handed regulation at Australian airports. The ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) evaluates and publicly reports the quality of service levels of the four largest airports on a yearly basis to pressure airports to maintain an acceptable service performance. This article aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the methodology used by the ACCC. This analysis includes a critical review of the methodology based on secondary information in combination with primary research (i.e., data from 21 semi-structured interviews) that considers the current perception of the methodology among key stakeholder groups. The research finds that the methodology used by the ACCC is underpinned by some limitations, putting in question its effectiveness, reliability and validity. Particularly, its weak design does not allow for a comprehensive interpretation of the reported results or a reliable comparison across monitored airports, thus reduces transparency. Stakeholders pointed out that it is not possible to evaluate whether an airport undertakes infrastructure investments that ensure both the efficiency of ongoing airport operations and appropriate levels of service quality. These limitations add to the perception that the ACCC in its current function is not a ‘credible threat’ to airports with market power. Recommendations and future research directions are provided to address the identified limitations.

Introduction

One key element of the light-handed regulation (LHR), as currently in place at Australia’s top four airports (i.e., Brisbane, Melbourne, Perth, Sydney), is the monitoring of quality of service. The LHR does not involve formal price regulation or place any immediate constraints on aeronautical charges but instead monitors airport prices and quality of service levels (Littlechild, 2012). Also, it carries the threat of re-imposing stricter regulation in cases where an abuse of market power is evident (Gillen, 2011). A main objective of the LHR is to overcome the drawback of conventional regulation frameworks imposing few incentives for the regulated enterprise to pursue productive efficiency (Vogelsang, 2002). Specifically, in Australia, the LHR aims to a) foster commercial negotiations between airport operators and their customers; b) decrease the costs of administration; and c) encourage airports to undertake infrastructure investments that ensure both efficiency of ongoing airport operations and appropriate levels of service quality (Arblaster, 2014; Lohmann and Trischler, 2017). The present article focuses on airport quality of service, including its monitoring approach as used by the ACCC. In its latest report, the Productivity Commission (PC) did not reach any conclusions regarding the quality of service levels at Australia’s monitored airports, apart from the observation that the airports have performed ‘relative to each other’ (Productivity Commission, 2011). This lack of analysis is somewhat troublesome when considering that quality of service levels among the four airports has brought mixed results since the start of the monitoring regime in 2001 (ACCC, 2016). In addition, the monitoring of service quality forms a key aspect of the LHR because this regime encourages airports to increase profits. One possible way to do this is by allowing service levels to fall through underinvestment (Francis et al., 2002; Adler et al., 2015). The argument that revenues from concession services, such as retailing, car parking and catering, might deter an airport from decreasing quality of services or delay infrastructure investments is not sufficiently grounded (Fu et al., 2011). Based on the limited attention given to quality of service as a key element of the LHR framework, the purpose of the present research is to provide an in-depth analysis of the methodology used by the ACCC to monitor the quality of service at the four Australian airports. The analysis includes a critical review of the methodology with secondary information in combination with primary research that considers the current perception of the monitoring approach among key stakeholder groups.

1- Introduction

2- Existing definitions of NZEBs and other related terms

3- The NZEB concept

4- Design strategy

5- Case studies

6- Case studies of existing buildings working towards a NZE status

7- Human-building interaction

8- Notable national and international policy support for promoting NZEBs

9- Discussion

10- Conclusions

References

Abstract

A Net Zero Energy Building (NZEB) is a term, subject to ambiguity, that could be used to describe a building with characteristics such as equal energy generation to usage, significantly reduced energy demands, energy costs equalling zero or net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Despite lacking an authoritative definition of NZEBs, this relatively new emerging concept in Australia provides significant opportunities to reduce GHG emissions, energy usage and operational energy costs for buildings owners. This paper aims to explore the existing NZEB models, assess the progression of NZEB literature, identify key policies encouraging NZEB development and recognise potential areas of NZEB research.

Introduction

The building sector is experiencing significant challenges inrelation to the consumption of energy, climate change and energy poverty issues [1]. Additionally, the long-term trend of increasing energy prices has led to the emerging market of renewable energy and led to decreasing costs of renewable energy technologies such as solar PVs [2]. This has pushed the boundaries for new developments in the built environment. One such development would be to design more sustainable residential and commercial buildings and retrofit the existing building stock to achieve energy neutrality or a Net Zero Energy Building (NZEB) status. A sustainable building may be defined as a building that maintains structural integrity, considers thehealth, safety, andcomfort ofusers,includes efficiency measures and considers environmental impacts [3] in another word “maximum energy gains and efficiency, minimizing loss” [4]. There are many examples of both commercial and residential buildings with zero energy status around the world however in Australia NZEBs are still uncommon, likely due to the anonymity of the concept to a mainstream audience. A Net Zero Energy Building is a term, subject to ambiguity, which could be used to describe a building with characteristics such as equal energy generation to usage, significantly reduced energy demands, energy costs equalling zero or net zero GHG emissions. Since 2006, different terms have been adopted to name different building concepts such as; (net) zero (source/site) energy building [5], zero energy costs building [5], zero energy emissions building [5], nearly zero energy building [6], zero emission building [7], zero carbon building [8], net-zero exergy building [9]. Specifically, an International Energy Agency (IEA) Joint Solar Heating and Cooling (SHC) report[10] addressed the NZEB issue, and its “Subtask A” was specifically dedicated to provide a definition framework. The fact sheet developed by Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE) [11] summarises the current status (as of April 2015) of different approaches and indicators used across Europe (member states and Norway) for the nZEB definition of new and existing buildings. The time frameusedtomeasure this energyneutrality isnot well defined in the literature. However, the vast majority of the studies discuss NZEBs that met their goal on an annual basis Carrilho da Grac¸ a et al. [12]. Sartori et al. [13] and Voss et al. [14] were among the first to discuss the implication of shorter balancing periods.

Introduction

Literature review

Methods

Findings and discussion

Conclusion and implications

References

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the voice of Chinese and Vietnamese international students through studying the similarities and differences in their learning experiences and the reasons underlying their experience.

Introduction

With the rising number of international students entering higher education institutions (HEIs) around the world, enhancing their experience in higher education (HE) takes on increasing importance. This paper examines the voice of Chinese and Vietnamese international students through studying the similarities and differences in their learning experiences within an Australian HEI and provides underlying reasons for their experiences. When used in this paper, we define “student experience” as encompassing key aspects of the engagement of students within HE, including the academic, social and cultural. The importance of garnering insight into the experiences of these students lies in the premise that when students feel that their experience in HE is positive, their overall satisfaction is more likely to be high (Ahmad, 2015; Ali et al., 2016; Arambewela and Maringe, 2012). The experiences of international students must be a key consideration given that in 2010, there were 4.1m globally mobile students recorded and this figure looks set to rise with estimates of there being 7m by 2020 (Abdullah et al., 2014). In the Australian context, HEIs are not only intensifying recruitment efforts, but exploring the experiences and responding to the unique needs of international students (Gomes, 2017; Marginson, 2012; Pham and Tran, 2015; Tran, 2011). According to Russell et al. (2010), accompanying this growth in the HE sector is a notable “increase in awareness of the range of student needs that must be met, the development of strategies to meet those needs and the conduct of research to strengthen both understanding and strategy” (pp. 235-236). We see this awareness and research to improve their experiences as critical in the current era both in Australia and other western countries. Developing this insight is problematized by the fact that while international students are “seen” in HE, Abdullah et al. (2014) posit that they are not really “heard” and “their ‘voice’ within the global HE system ‘remains invisible’ ” (p. 247). This is a view supported by Gargano (2009), who maintains that the experience of these students is yet to be rigorously researched. These missing voices are compounded by the fact that international students are often indiscriminately grouped together and homogenised (Russell et al., 2010; Song, 2014). This study contributes to the literature by providing a platform from which the voices of Chinese and Vietnamese international students can be “heard” and by unpacking the broad brush term of “Asian students” which dominates the discourse (Green, 2007; Lin and Scherz, 2014; Lin and Yi, 1997; Ramburuth and McCormick, 2001; Wong, 2004). We offer an insight into the challenges they face and their ideas for improvement. Understanding the reasons behind their challenges and listening to voices of specific national groups of international students about the ways to enhance their experience in HE becomes all the more necessary in light of increasing efforts by western HEIs to attract and retain international students coming from those countries.

1- INTRODUCTION

2- GAP IDENTIFICATION AND RATIONALISATION

3- AUDITOR-GENERAL INDEPENDENCE – THE TELEOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION

4- MODERN CONTEXTUAL ANALYS IS

5- CONCLUDING REMARKS

REFERENCES

Abstract

The introduction of an independent public sector audit function was a critical element in the nineteenth century constitutional reforms of parliamentary and government accountability and created an essential precedent for current practice. By examining the extent of scholarly research on public sector audit history, findings reveal considerable research examined the teleological development of public sector audit and the modern history in a New Public Management context. However, there has been very little published regarding the complex rationales around the origins, development and importance of independent public sector audit notwithstanding that without an appreciation of these precedents it becomes very difficult to protect the Westminster-based system of democratic government.

Introduction

This paper argues that more scholarly attention needs to be given to examining the constitutional place of auditorgeneral independence that developed in Britain during the nineteenth century and which is critical to modern day parliamentary sovereignty. The Westminster-based system of democratic government, relying on a combination of written constitutions and precedent, recognises an independent auditor-general as fundamental to government accountability. Indeed, the independent auditing of the expenditure of public funds is an essential part of constitutional safeguards (Funnell, Cooper, & Lee, 2012; Normanton, 1966). The development trajectory is also important in relation to understanding and protecting part-written constitutions such as that of Australia (Gilchrist & Coulson, 2015). Further, this history is important for educators and policymakers in terms of current public sector audit practice. Without an appreciation of the conditions by which governments function (including precedents relating to the purpose, powers and functioning of public sector auditors), and how they were arrived at, it becomes difficult to protect important controls in constitutional arrangements (Finn, 1987; Pilcher, Gilchrist, Singh, & Singh, 2013). Yet given that the topic of public sector audit, sometimes called state audit, history holds so much precedent for today’s practice, it is perhaps surprising that it has received significantly less attention than the related topic of accounting history – an area that has long been a source of interest to scholars.

Since January 2003, the European Union (EU) has launched over 30 civilian and military crisis management missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Their mandates have covered such tasks as peacekeeping, monitoring and mentoring, security sector reform, rule of law, counter-piracy and capacity-building. These missions and operations have seen the participation of both EU member states and third states. In order to help facilitate the participation of third states in these missions and operations, the EU established the Framework Partnership Agreements (FPAs) on crisis management in 2004, setting out the legal framework for third-state participation. In April 2015, Australia became the seventeenth country to sign an FPA with the EU (Australian Government and EU 2015). The signing of the FPA represents an important step in deepening security cooperation between the EU and Australia, and illustrates the extent to which the relationship has evolved and deepened since the start of diplomatic relations in 1962. Initially focused on economic issues, the expanding competences of the EU and the increased interaction between the EU and Australia have allowed the relationship to become more comprehensive in nature. As Murray (2016) has argued, the EU–Australia relationship has developed to become strategic in all but name. Recognition of shared common interests and values in contributing to global peace and stability has helped facilitate this. The ‘close historical, political, economic and cultural ties’, along with ‘their shared commitment to the respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms, democracy and the rule of law’ (Australian Government and EU 2008, 3), have become the basis of this relationship. This has been formalised in several agreements signed between the EU and Australia since the 1997 Joint Declaration (see Australian Government and EU 1997, 2008, 2017). In assessing the FPA, a Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT 2015, 3) report acknowledged that: ‘The proposed Agreement would be an important element in the Australia–EU bilateral relationship, strengthening the already broadbased cooperation on security and development matters’. DFAT acknowledged that the FPA would ‘add a new dimension to the Australia–EU strategic relationship’ (ibid.), thus illustrating the growing importance of the relationship. It also builds on Australia’s long-standing commitment to crisis management through its involvement in peacekeeping and post-conflict stabilisation missions in the Asia-Pacific and Africa.1 During her trip to Brussels in September 2016, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Julie Bishop, reaffirmed ‘Australia’s commitment to deeper, broader, more diverse cooperation with the European Union’ (Bishop and Ciobo 2016).