In this manuscript, we integrate work on political public relations research, strategic management, and multitrack diplomacy (from international relations scholarship) to advance the concept of citizens’ political public relations (PR), defined as strategies and choices devised by organized, local citizens to enhance inter-group and/or intra-group relations among conflicting groups. We demonstrate citizens’ political PR in action, using a case study to show how one activity planned by a group of organized everyday Ghanaian citizens, a football (soccer) tournament, helped promote better relationships among conflicting communities. We articulate the impact of not only a deliberate strategy devised by the group, but also of an emergent strategy that became evident through the choices made by the citizens in organizing the tournament. Theoretical implications of this new integrative conceptualization of citizens’ political PR for public relations scholarship are discussed.

Introduction

That public relations and/or communication as an organizational function is gaining increased legitimacy around the world is indisputable. Indeed, recent reports indicate that not only are organizations in North America recognizing the importance of public relations (Penning & Bain, 2019), so too are organizations around the world, including in Asia (Kim, Krishna, & Plowman, 2018), South America (Alaimo, 2016), and Africa (Nsehe, 2015). Such growth in the practice of public relations around the world has been paralleled by the development of a robust academic discipline, with conceptualizations and articulations of different theoretically driven and grounded models of public relations. From normative, systems approach-based models (e.g., Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002), relationship-centric models (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), and dialogic models (Kent & Taylor, 2002), to critical explorations of public relations practitioners being activists within the organization (Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002), public relations scholars have contributed extensively to our understanding of what public relations practice is and what it should be. However, one enduring criticism of public relations scholarship continues to be the ethnocentrism of North American-dominated models of public relations. For years scholars have called for further models of public relations and its practice that are informed by the cultures and societies in which they are set rather than applications of models from the West (e.g., Sriramesh, 2003; Halff & Gregory, 2014). To this end, scholars have offered insights from and examples of public relations practice from around the world, including the Middle East (Duthler & Dhanesh, 2018), South Africa (Venter, 2010), India (Patwardhan & Bardhan, 2014), Ghana (Wu & Baah-Boakye, 2009), and Colombia (Pastrana & Sriramesh, 2014) among many others. Notably, however, few models and examples exist of public relations strategies in action in Africa, particularly West Africa. Although a rich body of knowledge exists on public relations in South Africa (e.g., Benecke & Oksiutycz, 2015; le Roux, 2014), fewer examples of public relations in other parts of Africa, particularly West Africa, have been forthcoming.

1- Introduction

2- Consequences of warfare

3- Data and methodology

4- War and country-level outcomes

5- Military directors and firm performance

6- Robustness checks

7- Military directors and firm leverage

8- Conclusion and future research

References

Abstract

This study estimates the effects of wars on countries and firms. We first show immediate negative effects of wars on economic and financial development as well as legal institutions. Using a cross-country sample of 93,697 firm-year observations, we further argue and show that (i) wars increase the supply of military directors in corporate boards; and (ii) military directors reduce firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). We interpret these lingering effects as military directors possessing social capital but lacking business expertise. Our results are robust to a matched sample, a lagged difference model, a dynamic general method of moments model and to the control of country, industry and year fixed effects.

Introduction

War brings destruction to society and is often described as ‘‘development in reverse” (Collier et al., 2003). A large crosscountry literature shows that war-torn regions suffer from a substantial decline in total output, experience slower economic development, and have less persistent growth rates compared to similar but peaceful regions (Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). While this literature has been enormously influential, it has not yet been able to isolate a clear channel through which war influences economic performance. This paper links war to firm economic performance through directors with military experience. In doing so, we attempt to take a step further in understanding the relationship between, and the mechanism linking, war and its economic consequences. Understanding how war influences economic development is crucial, because nearly half of all countries in the world have suffered from either external or internal armed conflict in the past few decades (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). People living in war-affected places may be killed, traumatized, or separated from their families. They may also be displaced, prevented from attaining education, and excluded from skilled work. A vibrant stream of research documents the negative effects of war on later-life income, health, and education.

1- Introduction

2- Background

3- Mutual assured destruction and its deterrent benefit

4- Mutual assured destruction for information, influence and cyber warfare

5- A theory of and framework for cross domain deterrence

6- A theory of and framework for Multi-Domain deterrence and assured destruction

7- Evaluation of models and their efficacy

8- Conclusions and future work

References

Abstract

Mutual assured destruction is a key deterrent against the use of the most powerful weapons. The threat of it successfully prevented the deployment of a nuclear weapon during and since the United States versus Soviet Union Cold War. It has also prevented the escalation to total warfare scenarios (where countries fully deploy their arsenals and capabilities against each other). Cyber weapons are poised to potentially create more havoc, death and destruction than a single nuclear weapon would and there has been significant contemporary use of information and influence warfare. Given the foregoing, this paper investigates whether mutual assured destruction scenarios may exist which are (or could be) responsible for keeping the use of these warfare methods in check. Further, the paper considers whether the three types of warfare might be effective in holding the others in check.

Introduction

The advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed warfare. During the United States and Soviet Union Cold War, both sides developed enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other multiple times over [1]. Each side perceived the other to be a “sensible rational opponent” whose behavior was shaped by “threats of nuclear retaliation” from the other [2]. Each relied upon the other to be concerned about its own survival and to not take an action that would lead to its own annihilation by nuclear retribution. While some secondary [3] and proxy conflicts [4] occurred, neither side could risk deploying a nuclear weapon because of the anticipated response. The “strategic bi-polarity” model that defined the Cold War no longer represents the state of the world, in terms of physical conflict [2]. This was never an applicable model for cyber, information or influence warfare. Instead, the current status of physical world conflict is a state of “strategic multi-polarity” [2] and this same model, albeit with different players and means of warfighting, is representative of cyber, information and influence warfare. Under a the model of strategic multi-polarity, Curtis [2] contends, mutual assured destruction isn’t effective. For this deterrent approach to work, each state would require the capability to assure destruction to all other states and combinations of states that might attack it. Given that not all states have nuclear capabilities, this standard would clearly not be met. However, Curtis’s conclusion is a bit extreme.

Prior research has mostly examined the antecedents and impacts of purchasing counterfeits. However, there is little understanding of how marketers can mitigate this potential issue. The current research examines how gain versus loss message framing in an anti-counterfeit ad can be effective in persuading consumers with different political ideology (conservative vs. liberal). Results from two experiments show gain frames are more persuasive for liberals, whereas loss frames are more persuasive for conservatives in promoting an anti-counterfeit ad. Importantly, these effects are explained by different emotional reactions associated with message framing. Specifically, fear mediates the effects among conservatives, while hope mediates the effects among liberals. Findings from the current research joins four important research areas, including (1) anti-counterfeit, (2) political ideology, (3) message framing, and (4) discrete emotions, by theorizing that emotion reactions associated with message framing influence the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeit ad among consumers with different political ideology.

Introduction

The global luxury market has been increasing rapidly over the past decade. While recent research (Bain & Company, 2017) estimates the value of the global luxury market at almost $1.5 trillion, such growth and size means the market is open to forces that may try to share the spoils. One such threat is that of counterfeit luxury goods. This is particularly the case in recent times, given the costs to produce counterfeits are constantly being lowered (Hennigs, Wiedmann, Behrens, & Klarmann, 2013). Because of this, market information (International Chamber of Commerce, 2017) suggests that by 2022 counterfeiting and piracy will lead to $4.2 trillion in losses from the global economy, jeopardizing over 5 million legitimate jobs. Given the high stakes, research is required that provides better understanding of the factors that influence counterfeiting in order to mitigate risk and develop interventions that affect supply and demand of counterfeit luxury goods. Although the counterfeiting industry is fueled by different factors, such as technological innovation and globalization, the primary driver for the production of counterfeits is consumer demand (Chaudhrya, Cordellb, & Zimmermanc, 2005).

1- The model

2- The effect of uncertainty over policy: equilibrium policy

3- Uncertainty over policy: lobbying

4- Results

5- Concluding remarks

References

Citizens are often uncertain about the policies candidates will implement once elected (Baker et al., 2016). Indeed, it is common for politicians to deviate from their electoral platform. This work shows how this uncertainty affects electoral outcomes and policies when voters are risk averse. In particular, voters select candidates who carry out policies which can be very different, in expected terms, from the ones adopted when there is no uncertainty. These results can be better understood by looking at an important source of uncertainty over policy: the influence of lobbies on elected politicians. Large parts of electoral campaigns are devoted to either showing that a candidate cannot be trusted due to the controlling influence of special interests, or on the contrary, that a candidate can be trusted because she will not pander to lobbies. For example, during the 2016 US Presidential campaign the New York Times Editorial Board warned Hillary Clinton that her level of trustworthiness among voters was weak, when dealing with the Wall Street lobby. The debate at hand hinges on an inherent uncertainty faced by voters. While candidates often promise that their concerns are driven solely by policy, it is difficult to predict how they will react to offers made by special interest groups once in office. Indeed, citizens often express disappointment in their elected representatives’ decisions precisely on issues affected by lobbying. For example, a recent poll by CBS News/New York Times documented that 59% of Americans felt angry and disappointed by the results of a Senate vote which struck down a bipartisan measure for expanding background checks on gun owners, a topic that was subject to extensive lobbying by the National Rifle Association. Republican (86%), Democratic (95%) and Independent (83%) voters all favored this policy. Moreover, multiple polls conducted by Gallup show that, when American voters are asked whether they think their congressional representatives focus on the needs of special interest groups or the needs of their constituents, half of the respondents answer special interests. This range of responses suggests that elected politicians vary in their behavior with special interest groups or that some voters are not well informed about the linkages between their representatives and lobbies. Theories that investigate lobbying under uncertainty typically assess cases of special interest groups acting before the elections by providing candidates with campaign contributions. Much of that work focuses on the informational content that lobbying can provide to voters because special interest groups are assumed to be more informed than voters with regards to candidates’ skills. This paper takes a new approach, analyzing instead a model of lobbying in which rational voters are uncertain about the willingness of a candidate to trade policy for favors from lobbies, if elected. This theory allows for an examination of how uncertainty on the responsiveness to lobbying – which, in reality, is widespread – shapes the impact of special interest groups on policy. I outline a model of lobbying with risk-averse citizens whose preferences are distributed on a unidimensional policy space. Voters cast their vote and elect a politician from the pool of citizens who receives, in turn, a contribution proposal from a lobby, in exchange for a policy more in line with the lobby’s preferences. There is uncertainty with regard to two types of citizens: saints and merchants. Saints do not value contributions from lobbies if elected. Therefore they do not pander to the interests of lobbies and simply implement their preferred policy. Merchants, instead, positively value these donations and, if elected, implement a policy which is a compromise between their preferred policy and the lobby’s preferred policy.

1- Introduction

2- Research context: four peace education programs with Pakistani youth

3- Methodology

4- Findings

5- Significance of findings and policy implications

6- Conclusion

References

Abstract

This article examines the impact of four peace education programs involving Pakistani youth to illuminate peace education’s role in peacebuilding efforts in conflict contexts. It argues that alumni tried to replicate their individual transformations as stimulated by these peace education programs. They did so through communitylevel projects modelled after the same program processes that had transformed them. Impact on peacebuilding was supported by peace education programs combining different theories of change, focusing on follow-on projects, and providing support structures for alumni. Because alumni modelled their projects after their program experiences, programs should be more transparent in order to maximize impact.

Introduction

Despite the growing number of studies assessing the impact of peace education programs in conflict settings, these assessments usually focus on individual transformations in attitudes and/or beliefs resulting from encounters across conflict divides (e.g. Rosen and Salomon, 2011; Schubotz and Robinson, 2006). This emphasis on individual-level transformations ignores the connection between outcomes for individuals at the micro-level and outcomes that influence the development of peace at the macro-level. By focusing on the micro-level, researchers have not been explicit enough as to how peace education contributes to peacebuilding. This tendency to observe only micro-level effects is a common problem in both peace education assessment (Ross, 2010) and in peacebuilding evaluation more broadly (Gürkaynak et al., 2008). By contrast, Ned Lazarus (2011) and Karen Ross (2017) both highlight the community-level impact of peace education programs with Israeli and Palestinian youth by illuminating program components that led to the engagement of alumni in peacebuilding or social change activities (see also Ross and Lazarus, 2015). This article expands on the work of these scholars to further illustrate how peace education can both inspire and support youth to engage in peacebuilding activities in conflict environments. With this goal in mind, I examine four peace education programs involving Pakistani youth to explain how transformations experienced by participants, as a result of the programs, led to their efforts to better their communities. Accordingly, the article moves past studies that only look at individual attitude transformations resulting from peace education.

مقاله سال 2017

Wars have been a part of human life since prehistoric times and they are expected to play an important role in the future. The shape, characteristics, and size of wars have changed drastically over time due to transformations in Societies, Technologies, Economy, Environment, Politics and Values/Cultures (STEEPV). The military’s response to changing characteristics of warfare has been through ‘technology-driven’ and ‘concept-driven’ approaches. There have been times when new technologies enabled armies to develop new war concepts; and times when new concepts required the development of new technologies. In both cases, armies have aimed to adapt themselves to changing characteristic of warfare through military Research and Development (R&D), which is called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) (Krepinevich, 1992).

Historical transformations show that from the battle of Greek phalanxes to nano-soldiers’ network-centric warfare, there have been enormous shifts in the perception of threats and security. The key challenge for armies has been to remain resilient under changing circumstances of warfare due to transformations in STEEPV systems by adapting themselves constantly through RMA. The key research questions of the present study are: 1. Why and how have military technologies and concepts driven RMA as a response to changing conditions? 2. What are the emerging technologies and concepts, which may change the nature of warfare? 3. How can the future military R&D agenda be configured to respond to changing conditions?

To answer these questions, the second section of the paper begins with a review of the RMA literature within a broader historical perspective. First the RMA concept is introduced, and then key drivers for RMA are discussed. Building upon this background, Section 3 describes the research methodology with the use of a combination of literature review, patent-based technology trend analysis and scenario techniques to investigate the emerging military technologies and concepts. A research model is presented to illustrate how the key research question is addressed.

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical framework

3. Political representation of ethnic groups: basic principles

4. Assembly of people of Kazakhstan and ethnic representation

5. Conclusion

References

Contemporary principles of political representation of ethnic groups The article investigates some methods of political representation of ethnic groups, applied in different countries. The topicality of the research article is determined by 1) the growing influence of ethnicity and ethnic identity that differentiate people all over the world; 2) high potential for ethnic conflict in any heterogeneous society; 3) nationalization of many post-Soviet states and the exclusion of non-titular ethnic groups from the political life of these countries. The article aims to investigate basic principle, upon which more effective political representation of various ethnic groups is based. Among these principles factors are types of an electoral system, methods of positive discrimination and special ethnic institutions. The article states that principles appropriate for one country are improper for another, which is why in each case a specificity of the state, mentality of its people, history, and other factors must be taken into account. Nevertheless, the study of experience and mechanisms of representation in various countries is necessary for the assessment of the national policy of any state, where Kazakhstan is not an exception. 2015 is proclaimed as the year of the Assembly of People of Kazakhstan, which lead to the analysis of its results for a time of two decades in interethnic sphere including its constitutional right for political representation of ethnic groups.

Introduction

The world in the 21st century has undergone significant changes. Countries all over the world proclaimed their commitment to democratic principles, among which are inalienable human rights, political and legal equality of all citizens, the rule of law, etc. Important role in the construction of democracy belongs to political representation, as to a method of forming of public authorities. Citizens delegate their rights and authority to representatives, which in turn exercise powers on their behalf. By virtue of political representation different groups can participate in the political life of the country, including various ethnic groups. The representation of the latter is of big importance, as most of modern democracies are ethnically heterogeneous. Even if the country is perceived as monoethnic, there are other ethnic groups living there, which, in turn, raise the question of their social, cultural and political rights. Thus, for instance, though more than 90% of the population of Poland is of Polish nationality, political representation of the rest ethnic groups is of big importance there either. As Lord Acton once noticed “the most certain test by which we judge whether a country is really free is the amount of security enjoyed by minorities” (Acton, 2007, p.4). Political representation of women in government has been widely discussed by many authors, while the situation with ethnic representation needs further investigation. In most cases, cultural and social rights of ethnic groups are well protected, while their participation in political life of a country is not sufficient, as a result some ethnic groups are overrepresented in the power while others are underrepresented.

مقاله سال 2016

Negotiation has been an important field of study within organizational behavior and management science since the publication of Walton and McKersie’s (1965) book, A behavioral theory of labor relations, which provided in-depth descriptions of two different strategic approaches to negotiation in behavioral terms. Walton and McKersie (1965), themselves, were influenced by the newly emerging field of game theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). The game theory perspective can be seen in the pervasive focus on understanding deviations from rational negotiation outcomes. It was largely Pruitt (1981) and his students during the 1970s who brought the social psychological perspective and its rigorous experimental methods to negotiation research.

In this review, we adapt Brett’s model of culture and negotiation as an organizing guide for our examination of the literature (Brett, 2000). According to the model, negotiators’ interests and priorities affect the potential value of their joint gains. Negotiators’ strategies affect the nature of the interaction between the parties. How well the negotiated outcome captures the potential value of the negotiators’ joint gains depends on the nature of their interaction. Although Brett’s model was developed to examine inter-cultural negotiations, it also can be used to organize and examine the research on negotiation more broadly. Much of this research addresses factors that negotiators bring to negotiation and that affect their interests and priorities and or use of negotiation strategy, thereby affecting the nature of the interaction at the negotiation table. Specifically, we focus on psychological factors including: cognitions and biases, personality, motivation, emotions, inclination to trust; and on social-environmental factors including: reputation and relationship, gender, power and status, culture. We begin by reviewing the research on negotiation strategy. We then turn to the research on psychological and social-environmental factors that influence negotiators’ interests and priorities and use of strategy.

We pay special attention to the research that launched each area and then examine how the area has advanced. This is not a comprehensive, but a selective review. We focus on two-party negotiations in which people communicate and voluntarily choose to reach terms, what Nash (1950) referred to as cooperative negotiations. We do not review research on social and prisoner’s dilemmas, trust, ultimatum, or dictator games. However, we largely focus on empirical research that uses scoreable simulations in experimental designs. We conclude with a discussion of how future directions might address some of the limitations of current research.