Abstract

1. Continued cooperation, but with reduced scope, efficiency and influence

2. Potential instability

3. Scope for professional and academic engagement to improve efficiency and perhaps reduce instability

Funding

Declaration of competing interest

Abstract

The prospect of significantly reduced and potentially unstable EU-UK criminal justice cooperation under the 2020 Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) unless criminal justice professionals and academics can help to shape its future development. Key words Post-Brexit readjustment process; The EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA); EU-UK criminal justice cooperation

1. Continued cooperation, but with reduced scope, efficiency and influence

… an operational downgrade for law enforcement authorities across the UK … compared to what we had before, …though, if you look at it from the parameters of any other third country, we have done rather well …. 1

Part Three of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA)2 – the section dealing with criminal justice and security3 – indicates a spectrum of continuity/discontinuity in cooperation from January 1, 2021 onwards.4 This reveals both an initial (at least) loss of operational efficiency and a diminution of formal British government influence over the strategic development of EU criminal justice law, institutions and operational priorities, for example:

General continuity: data sharing (biometric and vehicle data via the Prüm arrangements and criminal records), PNR screening and confiscation measures.

In this manuscript, we integrate work on political public relations research, strategic management, and multitrack diplomacy (from international relations scholarship) to advance the concept of citizens’ political public relations (PR), defined as strategies and choices devised by organized, local citizens to enhance inter-group and/or intra-group relations among conflicting groups. We demonstrate citizens’ political PR in action, using a case study to show how one activity planned by a group of organized everyday Ghanaian citizens, a football (soccer) tournament, helped promote better relationships among conflicting communities. We articulate the impact of not only a deliberate strategy devised by the group, but also of an emergent strategy that became evident through the choices made by the citizens in organizing the tournament. Theoretical implications of this new integrative conceptualization of citizens’ political PR for public relations scholarship are discussed.

Introduction

That public relations and/or communication as an organizational function is gaining increased legitimacy around the world is indisputable. Indeed, recent reports indicate that not only are organizations in North America recognizing the importance of public relations (Penning & Bain, 2019), so too are organizations around the world, including in Asia (Kim, Krishna, & Plowman, 2018), South America (Alaimo, 2016), and Africa (Nsehe, 2015). Such growth in the practice of public relations around the world has been paralleled by the development of a robust academic discipline, with conceptualizations and articulations of different theoretically driven and grounded models of public relations. From normative, systems approach-based models (e.g., Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002), relationship-centric models (Ledingham & Bruning, 1998), and dialogic models (Kent & Taylor, 2002), to critical explorations of public relations practitioners being activists within the organization (Holtzhausen & Voto, 2002), public relations scholars have contributed extensively to our understanding of what public relations practice is and what it should be. However, one enduring criticism of public relations scholarship continues to be the ethnocentrism of North American-dominated models of public relations. For years scholars have called for further models of public relations and its practice that are informed by the cultures and societies in which they are set rather than applications of models from the West (e.g., Sriramesh, 2003; Halff & Gregory, 2014). To this end, scholars have offered insights from and examples of public relations practice from around the world, including the Middle East (Duthler & Dhanesh, 2018), South Africa (Venter, 2010), India (Patwardhan & Bardhan, 2014), Ghana (Wu & Baah-Boakye, 2009), and Colombia (Pastrana & Sriramesh, 2014) among many others. Notably, however, few models and examples exist of public relations strategies in action in Africa, particularly West Africa. Although a rich body of knowledge exists on public relations in South Africa (e.g., Benecke & Oksiutycz, 2015; le Roux, 2014), fewer examples of public relations in other parts of Africa, particularly West Africa, have been forthcoming.

This study aims to address how the 2008 Wenchuan Earthquake influenced knowledge generation and diffusion compared to the research stemming from the 1989 Loma Prieta Earthquake in the United States and the 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in Japan, for the three countries are exposed to high seismic risk. The findings show that (1) regarding research quantity, the influence of the Wenchuan Earthquake on disaster-related knowledge generation is just beginning compared with the gradual decreases in research on the other earthquakes; (2) regarding disciplinary development, the proportion of studies relating to the Wenchuan Earthquake in natural sciences and engineering technology is gradually decreasing, while the proportion of studies in medical science, social sciences and economics is increasing; (3) the quantity of earthquake-related studies is not solely related to the influence of a specific disaster but associated with the national financial support offered by the affected country. One reason why China experiences the high research output is that Chinese national finance strongly supports such research, similar to the United States and Japan. This phenomenon corresponds with the fact that the major research institutions in China are national institutions rather than universities. Finally, (4) interdisciplinary research on the Wenchuan Earthquake mainly involves interactions between natural sciences and engineering technology. Interactions between other disciplines need to be enhanced. Thus, this research argues that, although disaster knowledge generation and diffusion is imbalanced, the multidimensional nature of earthquakes has been recognized in the literature.

Introduction

The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 addresses knowledge-related issues and highlights the critical role knowledge plays in disaster risk reduction (UN, 2015). Knowledge of disaster risk in all its dimensions, such as vulnerability, capacity, hazard characteristics and the environment, can be leveraged for disaster risk assessment, prevention and mitigation, and for the development and implementation of effective response to disasters. Earthquakes, though rare and interruptive, trigger waves of learning, as they expose weaknesses and reveal previously unrealized potentials for change (Christianson et al. 2009). However, less knowledge has been generated from earthquakes than from other natural disasters (Housner, 1983). To address this gap, Liu et al. (2012) applied bibliometric methods to identify developments in disaster research. This study demonstrated that the quantity of disaster research has grown, including interdisciplinary research on the subject. Research in this area has focused on evolution, California, deformation, model, inversion, seismicity, tectonics, crustal structure, fault, zone, lithosphere, and attenuation. The Elsevier (2017) report on global disaster science demonstrated that research is increasingly focused more on prevention and preparedness and less on recovery. Countries’ scholarly output is also related to the disasters they face; for instance, Japan has more research focused on earthquakes and Tsunamis, the US on meteorological and biological disasters, Brazil and India on environmental disasters, and China on meteorological disasters.

1- Introduction

2- Consequences of warfare

3- Data and methodology

4- War and country-level outcomes

5- Military directors and firm performance

6- Robustness checks

7- Military directors and firm leverage

8- Conclusion and future research

References

Abstract

This study estimates the effects of wars on countries and firms. We first show immediate negative effects of wars on economic and financial development as well as legal institutions. Using a cross-country sample of 93,697 firm-year observations, we further argue and show that (i) wars increase the supply of military directors in corporate boards; and (ii) military directors reduce firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA). We interpret these lingering effects as military directors possessing social capital but lacking business expertise. Our results are robust to a matched sample, a lagged difference model, a dynamic general method of moments model and to the control of country, industry and year fixed effects.

Introduction

War brings destruction to society and is often described as ‘‘development in reverse” (Collier et al., 2003). A large crosscountry literature shows that war-torn regions suffer from a substantial decline in total output, experience slower economic development, and have less persistent growth rates compared to similar but peaceful regions (Barro, 1991; Alesina et al., 1996; Alesina and Perotti, 1996). While this literature has been enormously influential, it has not yet been able to isolate a clear channel through which war influences economic performance. This paper links war to firm economic performance through directors with military experience. In doing so, we attempt to take a step further in understanding the relationship between, and the mechanism linking, war and its economic consequences. Understanding how war influences economic development is crucial, because nearly half of all countries in the world have suffered from either external or internal armed conflict in the past few decades (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2007; Blattman and Miguel, 2010). People living in war-affected places may be killed, traumatized, or separated from their families. They may also be displaced, prevented from attaining education, and excluded from skilled work. A vibrant stream of research documents the negative effects of war on later-life income, health, and education.

1- INTRODUCTION

2- SOCIAL MEDIA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

3- SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE POLICE MANAGEMENT OF VISIBILITY

4- THE PUBLIC’S USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA: COUNTERSURVEILLANCE AND NETWORKED PUBLICS

5- DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

Abstract

Studies of social media’s impact on policing have emerged in several disciplines, including criminology, sociology, and communications. Despite their insight, there is no unified body of knowledge regarding this relationship. In an attempt to synthesize extant work, bring coherence to the field, and orient future scholarship, this article summarizes research on social media’s implications for practices and perceptions of order maintenance. It does so by identifying how social media’s technical affordances empower and constrain police services. By offering new opportunities for surveillance, risk communication, and impression management, emergent technologies augment the police’s control of their public visibility and that of the social world. However, they also provide unprecedented capacities to monitor the police and expose, circulate, and mobilize around perceived injustice, whether brutality, racial profiling, or other forms of indiscretion. Considering these issues promises to enhance knowledge on contemporary directions in social control, organizational communication, inequality, and collective action. Suggestions for future research are also explored.

INTRODUCTION

If control of information and visibility are decisive sources of power (Brighenti, 2007; Castells, 2013), the significance of social media—the most recent innovation in mediated communication—is difficult to overstate. Its accessibility, ease‐of‐ use, and participatory, networked character are transforming state‐society relations, dynamics distinctly conspicuous for order maintenance, the sovereign state’s prerogative power. Over the past decade, scholars in several disciplines have analyzed social media’s effects on policing. Despite their contribution, knowledge remains incipient and fragmentary. In an effort to bring coherence to existing work, this article assesses research on social media’s implications for policing’s operational and symbolic contours. While police services have leveraged visible digital spaces to communicate with citizens, sculpt their public image, and augment enforcement, they also allow citizens to expose, discuss, and mobilize around perceived injustice. Accordingly, new media environments are sites of considerable struggle over policing’s character, image, and meanings. After identifying its essential features and societal implications, this paper presents a typology of social media use, distinguishing between law enforcement’s status as monitors, producers, and objects of online content. In reducing the opacity of everyday life, social media are indispensable tools of surveillance and intelligence gathering. Police services have also appropriated multi‐media platforms as instruments of organizational communication, disseminating content to cultivate community support and enlist citizens in the management of crime, risk, and disorder. Finally, it considers how social media produce a “crisis of visibility” (Haggerty & Sandhu, 2014), unsettling law enforcement’s image and reputation. Specifically, it details how publics have utilized online forums to watch the powerful, expose abuse, and encourage institutional reform, oversight, and accountability. The paper concludes by discussing the import of these trends and suggesting future directions for research. Assessing emerging relations between law, society, and technology advances ongoing debates, providing new insights into patterns of social control, stratification, and collective action.

1- Introduction

2- Background

3- Mutual assured destruction and its deterrent benefit

4- Mutual assured destruction for information, influence and cyber warfare

5- A theory of and framework for cross domain deterrence

6- A theory of and framework for Multi-Domain deterrence and assured destruction

7- Evaluation of models and their efficacy

8- Conclusions and future work

References

Abstract

Mutual assured destruction is a key deterrent against the use of the most powerful weapons. The threat of it successfully prevented the deployment of a nuclear weapon during and since the United States versus Soviet Union Cold War. It has also prevented the escalation to total warfare scenarios (where countries fully deploy their arsenals and capabilities against each other). Cyber weapons are poised to potentially create more havoc, death and destruction than a single nuclear weapon would and there has been significant contemporary use of information and influence warfare. Given the foregoing, this paper investigates whether mutual assured destruction scenarios may exist which are (or could be) responsible for keeping the use of these warfare methods in check. Further, the paper considers whether the three types of warfare might be effective in holding the others in check.

Introduction

The advent of nuclear weapons fundamentally changed warfare. During the United States and Soviet Union Cold War, both sides developed enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other multiple times over [1]. Each side perceived the other to be a “sensible rational opponent” whose behavior was shaped by “threats of nuclear retaliation” from the other [2]. Each relied upon the other to be concerned about its own survival and to not take an action that would lead to its own annihilation by nuclear retribution. While some secondary [3] and proxy conflicts [4] occurred, neither side could risk deploying a nuclear weapon because of the anticipated response. The “strategic bi-polarity” model that defined the Cold War no longer represents the state of the world, in terms of physical conflict [2]. This was never an applicable model for cyber, information or influence warfare. Instead, the current status of physical world conflict is a state of “strategic multi-polarity” [2] and this same model, albeit with different players and means of warfighting, is representative of cyber, information and influence warfare. Under a the model of strategic multi-polarity, Curtis [2] contends, mutual assured destruction isn’t effective. For this deterrent approach to work, each state would require the capability to assure destruction to all other states and combinations of states that might attack it. Given that not all states have nuclear capabilities, this standard would clearly not be met. However, Curtis’s conclusion is a bit extreme.

Prior research has mostly examined the antecedents and impacts of purchasing counterfeits. However, there is little understanding of how marketers can mitigate this potential issue. The current research examines how gain versus loss message framing in an anti-counterfeit ad can be effective in persuading consumers with different political ideology (conservative vs. liberal). Results from two experiments show gain frames are more persuasive for liberals, whereas loss frames are more persuasive for conservatives in promoting an anti-counterfeit ad. Importantly, these effects are explained by different emotional reactions associated with message framing. Specifically, fear mediates the effects among conservatives, while hope mediates the effects among liberals. Findings from the current research joins four important research areas, including (1) anti-counterfeit, (2) political ideology, (3) message framing, and (4) discrete emotions, by theorizing that emotion reactions associated with message framing influence the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeit ad among consumers with different political ideology.

Introduction

The global luxury market has been increasing rapidly over the past decade. While recent research (Bain & Company, 2017) estimates the value of the global luxury market at almost $1.5 trillion, such growth and size means the market is open to forces that may try to share the spoils. One such threat is that of counterfeit luxury goods. This is particularly the case in recent times, given the costs to produce counterfeits are constantly being lowered (Hennigs, Wiedmann, Behrens, & Klarmann, 2013). Because of this, market information (International Chamber of Commerce, 2017) suggests that by 2022 counterfeiting and piracy will lead to $4.2 trillion in losses from the global economy, jeopardizing over 5 million legitimate jobs. Given the high stakes, research is required that provides better understanding of the factors that influence counterfeiting in order to mitigate risk and develop interventions that affect supply and demand of counterfeit luxury goods. Although the counterfeiting industry is fueled by different factors, such as technological innovation and globalization, the primary driver for the production of counterfeits is consumer demand (Chaudhrya, Cordellb, & Zimmermanc, 2005).

1- Introduction

2- Bilateral contracts negotiation

3- Proposed methodology

4- Case study

5- Conclusions

References

Abstract

Automated negotiation plays a crucial role in the decision support for bilateral energy transactions. In fact, an adequate analysis of past actions of opposing negotiators can improve the decision-making process of market players, allowing them to choose the most appropriate parties to negotiate with in order to increase their outcomes. This paper proposes a new model to estimate the expected prices that can be achieved in bilateral contracts under a specific context, enabling adequate risk management in the negotiation process. The proposed approach is based on an adaptation of the Q-Learning reinforcement learning algorithm to choose the best scenario (set of forecast contract prices) from a set of possible scenarios that are determined using several forecasting and estimation methods. The learning process assesses the probability of occurrence of each scenario, by comparing each expected scenario with the real scenario. The final chosen scenario is the one that presents the higher expected utility value. Besides, the learning method can determine which is the best scenario for each context, since the behaviour of players can change according to the negotiation environment. Consequently, these conditions influence the final contract price of negotiations. This approach allows the supported player to be prepared for the negotiation scenario that is the most probable to represent a reliable approximation of the actual negotiation environment.

Introduction

The Electricity Markets (EM) restructuring placed several challenges to governments and to the companies that are involved in generation, transmission, and distribution of electrical energy. The privatization of previously state owned companies, the deregulation of privately owned systems, and the internationalization of companies, are some examples of the transformations that have been applied [1]. Environmental concerns related to the use of fossil fuels have led to an increase in renewable energy generation sources. The considerable increase of distributed generation units makes EM more competitive, and consequently encourages a decrease in electricity prices [2,3]. However, some recurrent problems that are being addressed all over the world must be considered, such as the dispatch ability, limitations in the power system network, and the integration and large participation of small producers in the EM, among others [3]. Despite these problems, some global solutions are being adopted, some examples are the case of evolution of European EM. The majority of European countries have joined together into common market operators, resulting in joint regional EM composed of several countries, which supports transactions of huge amounts of electrical energy and allows the efficient use of renewable based generation in places where it exceeds the local needs [4]. Nowadays several market models exist, with a set of complex rules and particular regulations, creating the need to anticipate market behaviour. Some implemented market types have the clearing mechanism based on the optimization of offers, such as most electricity markets in the U.S. [5] and other based on symmetric or asymmetric bids, as is the case of most European countries [4]. However, electricity trade worldwide is also supported by means of bilateral contracts negotiation [6], which are the scope of this study. The common behaviour of market players in contracts negotiation is mainly based on the definition of prices and quantities in energy transactions with each competitor. Hence, relevant information concerning competitors’ history of previous negotiations can be used to improve the decision-making process, considering the characteristics of the moment of negotiation, namely to improve the forecasting of possible contract prices before the negotiation process [6]. It is essential to consider the concept of context awareness, since it influences the prices and quantities of energy to be negotiated. One example is the new ways of participating in EM, such as renewable resources, which has hardly influenced the players’ participation in the negotiation process, due to the dependency of environment factors, such as wind or solar intensity, that influence the final price of electricity. Other examples of contexts are the different types of days such as business days, weekends, holidays, or other days with special situations that affects energy consumption. A unique review of context analysis mechanism of EM negotiating players is presented in [7], which proposed a methodology of analysing the past negotiation context to distinguish days and periods with similar characteristics.

1- The model

2- The effect of uncertainty over policy: equilibrium policy

3- Uncertainty over policy: lobbying

4- Results

5- Concluding remarks

References

Citizens are often uncertain about the policies candidates will implement once elected (Baker et al., 2016). Indeed, it is common for politicians to deviate from their electoral platform. This work shows how this uncertainty affects electoral outcomes and policies when voters are risk averse. In particular, voters select candidates who carry out policies which can be very different, in expected terms, from the ones adopted when there is no uncertainty. These results can be better understood by looking at an important source of uncertainty over policy: the influence of lobbies on elected politicians. Large parts of electoral campaigns are devoted to either showing that a candidate cannot be trusted due to the controlling influence of special interests, or on the contrary, that a candidate can be trusted because she will not pander to lobbies. For example, during the 2016 US Presidential campaign the New York Times Editorial Board warned Hillary Clinton that her level of trustworthiness among voters was weak, when dealing with the Wall Street lobby. The debate at hand hinges on an inherent uncertainty faced by voters. While candidates often promise that their concerns are driven solely by policy, it is difficult to predict how they will react to offers made by special interest groups once in office. Indeed, citizens often express disappointment in their elected representatives’ decisions precisely on issues affected by lobbying. For example, a recent poll by CBS News/New York Times documented that 59% of Americans felt angry and disappointed by the results of a Senate vote which struck down a bipartisan measure for expanding background checks on gun owners, a topic that was subject to extensive lobbying by the National Rifle Association. Republican (86%), Democratic (95%) and Independent (83%) voters all favored this policy. Moreover, multiple polls conducted by Gallup show that, when American voters are asked whether they think their congressional representatives focus on the needs of special interest groups or the needs of their constituents, half of the respondents answer special interests. This range of responses suggests that elected politicians vary in their behavior with special interest groups or that some voters are not well informed about the linkages between their representatives and lobbies. Theories that investigate lobbying under uncertainty typically assess cases of special interest groups acting before the elections by providing candidates with campaign contributions. Much of that work focuses on the informational content that lobbying can provide to voters because special interest groups are assumed to be more informed than voters with regards to candidates’ skills. This paper takes a new approach, analyzing instead a model of lobbying in which rational voters are uncertain about the willingness of a candidate to trade policy for favors from lobbies, if elected. This theory allows for an examination of how uncertainty on the responsiveness to lobbying – which, in reality, is widespread – shapes the impact of special interest groups on policy. I outline a model of lobbying with risk-averse citizens whose preferences are distributed on a unidimensional policy space. Voters cast their vote and elect a politician from the pool of citizens who receives, in turn, a contribution proposal from a lobby, in exchange for a policy more in line with the lobby’s preferences. There is uncertainty with regard to two types of citizens: saints and merchants. Saints do not value contributions from lobbies if elected. Therefore they do not pander to the interests of lobbies and simply implement their preferred policy. Merchants, instead, positively value these donations and, if elected, implement a policy which is a compromise between their preferred policy and the lobby’s preferred policy.

1- Introduction

2- Research context: four peace education programs with Pakistani youth

3- Methodology

4- Findings

5- Significance of findings and policy implications

6- Conclusion

References

Abstract

This article examines the impact of four peace education programs involving Pakistani youth to illuminate peace education’s role in peacebuilding efforts in conflict contexts. It argues that alumni tried to replicate their individual transformations as stimulated by these peace education programs. They did so through communitylevel projects modelled after the same program processes that had transformed them. Impact on peacebuilding was supported by peace education programs combining different theories of change, focusing on follow-on projects, and providing support structures for alumni. Because alumni modelled their projects after their program experiences, programs should be more transparent in order to maximize impact.

Introduction

Despite the growing number of studies assessing the impact of peace education programs in conflict settings, these assessments usually focus on individual transformations in attitudes and/or beliefs resulting from encounters across conflict divides (e.g. Rosen and Salomon, 2011; Schubotz and Robinson, 2006). This emphasis on individual-level transformations ignores the connection between outcomes for individuals at the micro-level and outcomes that influence the development of peace at the macro-level. By focusing on the micro-level, researchers have not been explicit enough as to how peace education contributes to peacebuilding. This tendency to observe only micro-level effects is a common problem in both peace education assessment (Ross, 2010) and in peacebuilding evaluation more broadly (Gürkaynak et al., 2008). By contrast, Ned Lazarus (2011) and Karen Ross (2017) both highlight the community-level impact of peace education programs with Israeli and Palestinian youth by illuminating program components that led to the engagement of alumni in peacebuilding or social change activities (see also Ross and Lazarus, 2015). This article expands on the work of these scholars to further illustrate how peace education can both inspire and support youth to engage in peacebuilding activities in conflict environments. With this goal in mind, I examine four peace education programs involving Pakistani youth to explain how transformations experienced by participants, as a result of the programs, led to their efforts to better their communities. Accordingly, the article moves past studies that only look at individual attitude transformations resulting from peace education.

The fields of foreign policy and public policy have had very little interaction, yet a vast trove of scholarly work in the discipline of public policy exists alongside great contributions to foreign policy decision making (FPDM). The purpose of this article is to provide a review of the literature within the discipline of FPDM which is focused on key group decision-making models, enriched by the application of a well-known public policy concept, the policy cycle. Both public policy and foreign policy deal with group decision-making analysis, yet their toolkits are quite distinct. By engaging in cross-fields efforts, scholars can fill gaps and bring new insights in the respective fields. Specifically, we demonstrate an association between stages of the policy cycle and leading models of group decision-making dynamics. We first lay the public policy foundations for our review by providing a brief summary of the policy cycle broadly and then more precisely the stages of policy formulation, decision making, and implementation. We then highlight a new framework (the group decision-making continuum) and summarize three leading models of group decision-making dynamics within the literature of FPDM: groupthink, polythink, and con-div. We discuss the foundations and current trends in the application of each model to foreign policy and national security decision making. We will demonstrate how scholars have utilized these leading models to explain foreign policy decisions. However, these scholars have not yet linked group dynamics to stages in the policy cycle. Likewise, none of these scholars have demonstrated how group dynamics may shift through stages of a foreign policy decision. Our review constructs a bridge between stages of the policy cycle and specific group decisionmaking models to expand on our understanding of foreign policy decision making. To illustrate the applicability of this interdisciplinary endeavor, we provide a brief example of group decision-making models within the context of policy stages of the Obama administration’s actions in the 2016 Raqqa Campaign against the Islamic State.

1- Introduction

2- Previous research

3- Materials and methods

4- Results

5- Discussion

6- Limitations

7- Conclusions

References

Abstract

Recent studies have reported a significant relationship between the use of social media and political engagement. However, there appear to be few comparative studies that explore the association between social networking site use and participation in different types of protest activities for the case of Latin America. The present study employs supervised and unsupervised data analysis techniques to explore this association for 9 different social networking sites and 5 types of protest using disaggregated data on 17 Latin American countries. Multiple correspondence analysis is applied to create proxy measures of the two phenomena, followed by a cluster analysis using these measures to classify individuals into different clusters in each country studied. These clusters indicated that there exists an interplay between the use of these sites and participation in protests. Decision rules were then induced to generate interpretable information on the clusters identified for each country. The results suggest that there is a high degree of heterogeneity in social networking site use and protest participation.

Introduction

Latin America has been the setting for a number of civil protest movements over the last decade in which Internet social media have been used as a means of political expression (Guzman-Concha, 2012; Perez-Li ´ n˜an and Polga- ´ Hecimovich, 2016; Anselmi, 2017; Valenzuela, 2013; Harlow, 2011). This article explores the relationship between the use of different social networking sites and participation in protest activities in a series of Latin American countries. Recent comparative studies have shown that there is a positive relationship between social media use and protest participation (Kim and Chen, 2016; Boulianne, 2017; Dong et al., 2017; Gan et al., 2017). Meta-analyses, for example, have found evidence of a relationship between social media use and such participation in both online and offline environments (Skoric et al., 2016a; Boulianne, 2015, 2017; Skoric et al., 2016b). In one of these investigations, based on 133 cross—sectional studies, the author concluded that the effects of using social media on such participation are stronger for political expression and weaker for informational purposes (Boulianne, 2017). What was not established in these studies, however, was which social media was (were) associated with which type(s) of protest. There thus remains a need to identify the more specific relationships existing between the latter and the many different social networking sites that currently exist. The exploration of individuals’ use of such sites, or of the many types of protest they may participate in, is a complex, multidimensional task, however. To be sure, considerable work has already been done on the use by individuals of multiple social media channels. For example, in Hecking et al. (2018, 2017) the authors develop a tool and a strategy for analyzing the dissemination of content through Web pages, Twitter and Wikipedia. Another case is Farahbakhsh et al. (2016), which explores the cross-posting activity of users across three major social networking sites: Facebook, Twitter and Google+. But the research into this phenomenon is complicated by the sheer number of different social media, various problems to do with defining data models, anonymisation and privacy issues, and certain ethical questions (Henderson et al., 2013; Kaslow et al., 2011). Investigations have also shown that individuals engage in a variety of different types of protest (Mourao et al. ˜ , 2016; Fourcade et al., 2016; Harlow and Harp, 2012). Traditional protest modes and those that actually bring about changes in social situations still occur in offline environments but it is also true that much protest is now taking place online (Harlow and Harp, 2012). The latter type of activity is frequently hosted by social networking sites. But if, as we have just observed, tracking the use of multiple sites and the participation in different protest modes are complex tasks when tackled separately, the complexities of exploring the relationships between them are even greater. The present work therefore proposes to take the first step towards filling the gaps in our knowledge on these relationships by investigating the interplay between users of specific social media sites and their participation in specific protest activities in Latin America. Furthermore, our analysis will be conducted at a disaggregated level, that is, country by country. Thus, we will explore the association between participation in 5 types of protest activity and the use of 9 social media sites in 17 different Latin American countries. For each of these countries our objective will be threefold: (i) to explore the patterns of social networking site use and protest participation, (ii) to cluster individuals according to these two concepts, and (iii) to interpret the resulting clusters. To accomplish this we will bring to bear three techniques in turn: (i) multiple correspondence analysis, (ii) agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis, and (iii) decision rules induction. The first two are data exploration techniques while the third is an automatic supervised learning technique we will apply to derive interpretable information from the clusters obtained using the second technique. This approach will allow us to carry out our analyses in a low-dimensional space.